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Abstract
In a world where ideas flow freely between people across multi-
ple platforms, we often find ourselves relying on others’ information
without an objective standard to judge whether those opinions are
accurate. The present study tests an agreement-in-confidence hy-
pothesis of advice perception, which holds that internal metacogni-
tive evaluations of decision confidence play an important functional
role in the perception and use of social information, such as peers’
advice. We propose that confidence can be used, computationally,
to estimate advisors’ trustworthiness and advice reliability. Specifi-
cally, these processes are hypothesized to be particularly important
in situations where objective feedback is absent or difficult to acquire.
Here, we use a judge-advisor system paradigm to precisely manipulate
the profiles of virtual advisors whose opinions are provided to partic-
ipants performing a perceptual decision making task. We find that
when advisors’ and participants’ judgments are independent, people
are able to discriminate subtle advice features, like confidence calibra-
tion, whether or not objective feedback is available. However, when
observers’ judgments (and judgment errors) are correlated - as is the
case in many social contexts - predictable distortions can be observed
between feedback and feedback-free scenarios. A simple model of ad-




















to explain key patterns of results observed in the human data. We use
agent-based modeling to explore implications of these individual-level
decision strategies for network-level patterns of trust and belief for-
mation.
1 Introduction
Situations in which feedback on others’ performance is not immediately avail-
able are abundant in our life. In many contexts, including in education and
health, we rely on advice but may not have immediate feedback or other
objective standards with which to judge the reliability of that advice. Yet
in these contexts we must learn to distinguish good from bad advice and
consequently which advisors we should trust. How people do this, and how
reliably they do so, are open questions.
Many influential models of trust rely on the trustee’s characteristics, like
their ability or integrity (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). In some situ-
ations, the environment might provide contextual cues regarding such char-
acteristics (e.g., individual, institutional or qualification-based reputation of
the advisor). However, here we are interested in whether people can learn
advice reliability through experience even in domains where feedback is spo-
radic, unreliable or completely absent - and what mechanisms underlie trust
formation in these contexts. Specifically, we investigate whether people can
detect subtle informational differences among their social partners in the
absence of any objective feedback and, if so, whether the trustor’s internal
metacognitive states play a role in their estimation of advice reliability.
When available, external (reliable) feedback can guide learning through
reinforcement learning mechanisms that have been thoroughly described in
previous research (Behrens, Hunt, Woolrich, & Rushworth, 2008; Guggen-
mos, Wilbertz, Hebart, & Sterzer, 2016; Sutton & Barto, 1998). But learning
may also be needed when such feedback is not available. Our hypothesis is
that this seemingly computationally intractable problem can be solved by
using two pieces of evidence that are always available when learning about
the reliability of other social actors - namely, the advisor’s agreement rate
with one’s own belief and one’s own internal decision confidence: If on a
given decision we are certain we are correct, then we can equally be certain
that anyone who disagrees with us is wrong, and accordingly down-weight
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their opinion in the future. If on the contrary we make a choice with less con-
fidence, we should still down-weight disagreeing advice, but now to a lesser
extent. In other words, we suggest that people can overcome the absence of
objective feedback by exploiting the trial-by-trial co-variation between their
own internal decision confidence and the actual state of the environment
(Pescetelli, Rees, & Bahrami, 2016). We call this heuristic the agreement-in-
confidence heuristic. In contrast with other strategies based on classification
variability (Weiss & Shanteau, 2003), which require repeated observations,
this simple mechanism allows people to estimate an advisor’s reliability even
in one-shot interactions. This strategy is consistent with previous results
showing a decrease of the weight put on advice as a factor of distance from
one’s own opinion (Yaniv, 2004).
Confidence can be formally defined as the likelihood of being correct given
the evidence and the decision made (Fleming & Daw, 2017). It has been
shown to be an important factor that allows cognitive control (Botvinick,
Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Fleming & Dolan, 2012) and meta-
learning (Flavell, 1979). Confidence has also been shown to be involved in
group decisions and information integration processes (Bonaccio & Dalal,
2006) and the importance of confidence in human interactions is well es-
tablished. Much of this literature employs the judge-advisor system (JAS)
paradigm (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Sniezek & Buckley, 1989; Yaniv & Klein-
berger, 2000), in which a participant (“judge”) is typically asked to give a
first answer to a question and is then presented with the opinions of one
or more advisors whose advice can then be used to update the initial judg-
ment. Evidence suggests that confident eyewitness testimony is weighted
more by members of a jury (Penrod & Cutler, 1995; Roediger III, Wixted,
& Desoto, 2012), confident people are trusted more and are more influential
within groups (Swol & Sniezek, 2005; Zarnoth & Sniezek, 1997), and confi-
dence mediates the effect of power on advice taking (Tost, Gino, & Larrick,
2012). People have been shown to use confidence to arbitrate disagreement
irrespective of true accuracy (Hertz, Romand-Monnier, Kyriakopoulou, &
Bahrami, 2016; Mahmoodi et al., 2015; Penrod & Cutler, 1995). However
being confident comes to a cost if confidence is not predictive of accuracy
(i.e., if confidence is not calibrated). For instance people tend to distrust
confident but unreliable testimony (Tenney, MacCoun, Spellman, & Hastie,
2007), at least when feedback is provided or easy to acquire (Sah, Moore, &
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Maccoun, 2013).
The hypothesis explored here is that the role of confidence in social scenar-
ios goes beyond the simple weighting of diverse opinions, and can in addition
be used to approximate useful inferences about others. Two lines of rea-
soning converge to this conclusion. First, in a probabilistic framework, con-
fidence can be interpreted as the subjective estimated likelihood of having
made the correct decision, given the internal sensory states and the decision
made (Aitchison, Bang, Bahrami, & Latham, 2015; Fleming & Daw, 2017;
Meyniel, Sigman, & Mainen, 2015; Pouget, Drugowitsch, & Kepecs, 2016).
Second, in many perceptual tasks used in group decision and advice-taking
studies, accuracy correlates within-participant with confidence; that is, more
confidently expressed judgments are, on average, more likely to be correct
(Henmon, 1911; Koriat, 2012b). We suggest that these features make confi-
dence signals extremely valuable when objective feedback is missing because
they can be used as a proxy for feedback when the latter is absent. We
further speculate that subjective confidence can be used (albeit with inher-
ent noise) to infer the likelihood that a social advisor is correct in a similar
way that external feedback is used to track advice reliability using simple
reinforcement learning rules (Behrens et al., 2008).
Studies on the false consensus effect (Dawes, 1989), whereby people who
endorse an answer believe that others are also more likely to endorse it, have
shown that it is indeed rational to use one’s own belief as a significant sam-
ple of the population and to base predictions about others on such beliefs.
More recently, Bahrami et al. (2012a) demonstrated that in the absence of
trial-by-trial feedback, participants were able to accrue collective benefit -
that is, with group performance exceeding that of the most accurate mem-
ber’s performance - if verbal interaction between participants was allowed.
In contrast, providing objective feedback on members’ trial accuracy but not
allowing for verbal communication did not lead to a collective benefit. This is
an interesting finding considering that what should ultimately drive trust in a
partner and the decision to follow their judgment is their accuracy rate. Pre-
vious studies had demonstrated that conveying information about confidence
between participants is crucial for collective benefits in group performance
(Bahrami et al., 2012b; Fusaroli et al., 2012; Koriat, 2012b).
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To the best of our knowledge, studies have so far investigated a person’s
confidence either as a signal to others (e.g., confident advisors are trusted
more (Bahrami et al., 2010; Penrod & Cutler, 1995; Swol & Sniezek, 2005)),
or as a signal for one self (e.g., confidence reflects a person’s perceived likeli-
hood of being correct (Aitchison et al., 2015; Botvinick et al., 2001; Fleming
& Daw, 2017; Meyniel et al., 2015)). The present work’s contribution is in
exploring how people’s own confidence also affects their learning about oth-
ers and thus how influential received social information will be. The study
investigates learning in feedback-free scenarios, which have received little re-
search attention to date (see (Rouault, Dayan, & Fleming, 2019; Weiss &
Shanteau, 2003) for exceptions).
We investigate these questions using a perceptual decision paradigm.
These paradigms have become popular in recent group decision studies (Bahrami
et al., 2010; Bang et al., 2017; Sorkin, Hays, & West, 2001) due to the high
degree of control that experimenters have over the information provided to
participants and the ability to define an optimal behavior. Our findings
show that people are indeed able to learn the reliability of an information
source even when deprived of external feedback, and indicate that they do so
by relying on internal signals of decision confidence. We further show that
this simple mechanism works well when the advisor and advisee’s judgments
are independent, but shows predictable downsides when information between
them is correlated.
1.1 Overview of the current research
To investigate the question of whether people use metacognitive information
to judge the reliability of a source of advice when other cues are unavailable,
we devised a computer-based judge-advisor system task in which participants
performed a series of simple perceptual judgments where they first gave their
response and associated confidence, then were shown the opinion of differ-
ent virtual advisors with predetermined informational profiles, and finally
were asked to state their (perhaps revised) decision and confidence. Cru-
cially we manipulated across participants the presence of objective feedback
on a trial-by-trial basis. The feedback group provides a baseline where we
expected participants to accurately judge advisor reliability (Behrens et al.,
2008). The behavior of interest is whether, in the absence of feedback, partic-
ipants are still able to track the reliability of different advisors, and whether
they use this reliability estimate to weight proffered advice appropriately.
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Two measures of trust were recorded to allow for dissociations between im-
plicit and explicit behaviors. First, participants were asked to rate explicitly
the reliability of advisors every second block of the experiment (see Supple-
mentary Information for details). Second, the degree to which participants
updated their judgments and associated confidence from pre- to post-advice
provided an implicit measure of judged reliability, with larger updates indi-
cating greater advice influence (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006).
This paradigm builds on traditional advice-taking tasks that have com-
monly used factual knowledge and forecasting tasks (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006;
Soll & Mannes, 2011; Tenney et al., 2007; Yaniv, 2004) by allowing direct
manipulation of the perceptual evidence available to participants (as it is the
case in psychophysics). At the same time, the use of “virtual” rather than
real human advisors (cf. Bahrami et al. (2010) and Zarnoth and Sniezek
(1997)) allows us strict control over the informational content of the social
sources. Bayes theorem can be used to compute the precise information car-
ried by each advisor, as a normative framework within which to test our
hypotheses and evaluate participants’ performance.
Experiment 1 was designed to test the value of using personal confidence
information to learn subtle but important advisors’ characteristics, specifi-
cally advice accuracy and calibration. When feedback is readily available,
both accuracy (Behrens et al., 2008) and calibration (Tenney et al., 2007)
have been shown to be valued advice features affecting both advice trustwor-
thiness and influence. By manipulating across participants the availability
of trial-by-trial feedback, we show that people are capable of learning subtle
cues in their advisors, and both with and without objective feedback they
value accurate advice and calibrated advisors.
We use a simple Bayesian confidence-updating rule to generate formal
predictions of different strategies for estimating advice reliability, when ap-
plied to the collected data. When objective feedback is available, the model
can use the accuracy history of the advisor to estimate its reliability (Accu-
racy variant). When feedback is absent on the contrary, two alternative rules
could in principle be used to overcome the absence of objective feedback, but
only one is endowed with access to metacognitive information. Both model
variants exploit the association existing between accuracy and agreement
among observers (Koriat, 2012b). Assuming judgments are independent and
performance is above chance, agreement rate provides an indication of an
6
advisor’s accuracy (e.g., two perfectly accurate observers will agree 100% of
the time on the correct answer). Exploiting this feature, a first model vari-
ant (the Confidence variant) uses a nuanced strategy that weights agreement
by subjective pre-advice confidence. According to this strategy, high con-
fidence agreement is more informative than low confidence agreement. We
contrasted the Confidence variant with a simpler Consensus variant, which
does not have access to pre-advice confidence and instead simply estimates
the reliability of the advisors according to the rate of agreement with each
advisor. We show that these simple algorithms capture patterns of the results
seen in the human data.
In Experiment 1, advisors’ judgements were independent from the par-
ticipant’s judgments. Experiments 2 and 3 extend Experiment 1 with two
related aims. The first one is to distinguish between the Consensus and Con-
fidence variants. The second is to explore inherent limitations in consensus
and confidence-based estimates of reliability. Notice that agreement-based
models have an inherent flaw in them: An agent using an agreement-based
strategy will systematically overestimate the reliability of advisors who agree
with the agent when the agent is wrong, or in other words when agent and
advisor share the same biases in their judgments. Systematic deviations will
occur whenever two people are basing their judgments on the same, incom-
plete information, or making a decision with the same inherent biases (cf.
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974)). We expect these situations to be frequent
in many everyday scenarios - e.g., online environments - where people can
easily self-assort into information-insulated cliques (Sunstein, 2001). Key to
both aims is manipulation of the coupling between agreement and accuracy
by breaking the independence of initial judgment and advice that is present
in Experiment 1. We predict that this will lead to predictable distortions in
trust and influence, that differ from feedback-based objective reliability of
advice, and that the patterns of trust and influence are best captured by a
Confidence variant.
In this way, we combine experiments with model-informed analyses. The
experiments track patterns of trust emerging in human participants in a task
in which advice information and perceptual evidence is carefully manipu-
lated. The models identify the patterns of trust and influence that should be
observed if people adopted simple learning strategies based on accuracy es-
timated from feedback, simple agreement or confidence-weighted agreement.
In a final section, we use agent-based modeling to provide a preliminary ex-
ploration of the way in which the simple mechanisms of trust formation that
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we identify empirically might generalize to affect network formation in larger
groups of interacting individuals.
2 Experiment 1
Experiment 1 investigates whether people learn about subtle advice reliability
cues - specifically, advice accuracy and calibration - in environments that
lack objective feedback. Four virtual advisors with differing reliability were
designed. They differed in accuracy (proportion correct) and calibration
(how expressed confidence scales with probability correct (Fleming & Lau,
2014)). Participants repeatedly experienced each advisor to give them the
opportunity to learn about advisor reliability. Learning was examined in
terms of both explicit rating of trust in each advisor, and implicit expression
of advice influence, to allow for possible dissociations between explicit and
implicit trust. The crucial question of interest was whether these measures
of trust and influence would be sensitive to differences in advisor accuracy
and calibration even in the absence of objective feedback about the correct
answer on each trial. By including a second group of participants, who
did have access to trial-by-trial feedback, we could also assess the degree to
which the putative agreement-in-confidence heuristic provided an adequate
vs. imperfect proxy for objective feedback
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants
Volunteers (N = 46, females = 26, age = 23 ± 0.45) were recruited in ex-
change for monetary compensation or course credits. Half of the partici-
pants were assigned to the Feedback condition and the other half to the
No-Feedback condition. The study was approved by local ethical committee.
All participants gave informed consent prior to participation.
2.1.2 Paradigm
The perceptual task used is a dot-count comparison task already described
in Boldt and Yeung (2015), in which participants are asked to judge which of
two boxes contains more dots (Figure 1). The boxes are presented briefly, for
160 ms, to the left and right of a fixation cross, with dots randomly arranged
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in a 20 x 20 grid. One box contains more dots, specifically ndots = 200 + d,
compared to the other with ndots = 200 − d. By manipulating the d pa-
rameter we can control the difficulty of the task. Difficulty was titrated
to each individual sensitivity by applying a 2-down-1-up staircase procedure
(Treutwein, 1995) to ensure similar overall accuracy across participants (nom-
inal accuracy rate = 70.7%). The location of the box with more dots was
predetermined in advance by pseudo-randomisation that ensured the number
of left and right correct answers was balanced across the experiment.
Figure 1: Panel A: Experiment 1 paradigm. The task represents a com-
puterised version of the classical judge-advisor system (Sniezek & Buckley,
1989). In our version, the participant first makes a decision about which box
contains most dots. The participant expresses his/her opinion on a semi-
continuous confidence scale ranging from “100% sure left” to “100% sure
right”. They are then presented with the opinion of a virtual advisor and are
asked to update their original judgment with a new rating along the scale.
Panel B: A simple model that estimates accuracy from pure agreement rate
will understimate the accuracy of any advisor unless the model itself is always
correct in its judgments: Estimated accuracy = a*b + (1-a)*(1-b), where a is
the objective accuracy of the judge’s decisions and b is the advisor’s accuracy;
i.e., their likelihood of agreeing on the correct answer plus their likelihood of
agreeing on an incorrect answer.
After the brief visual presentation of the stimuli (160 ms) participants had
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unlimited time to enter their response and confidence judgment. They did
so in a one-step decision by clicking with the mouse along a semi-continuous
scale in 10 steps - ranging from “100% sure left” to “100% sure right” -
and confirming their response pressing the spacebar. Text landmarks sig-
nalling 10% increases aided the interpretation of the scale. The middle point
of the scale (50% or total uncertainty) was removed and a gap appeared in-
stead, meaning that participants had to commit to one interval (2-alternative
forced-choice).
After confirming their response, one out of four different advisors ap-
peared at the center of the screen as a head-shot picture. Pictures were
selected from the NimStim database (Tottenham et al., 2009) and depicted
four Caucasian, smiling female characters that were randomly assigned for
each participant to one of the four accuracy/calibration conditions described
below. Advice was provided as a pre-recorded female voice through active
noise-cancelling headphones. Audio tracks were recorded in from native En-
glish speakers and their duration was altered with Audacity R© so that all
lasted for exactly two seconds. The association between advisor voice, face
and advice profile was randomised across participants to avoid confounds due
to appearance or voice characteristics. Advisors could express a binary level
of confidence (low vs. high) and either agree or disagree with the participant’s
judgment. Low confidence was expressed by the sentences “I think it was on
the [LEFT/RIGHT]” and “It was on the [LEFT/RIGHT], I think”, with one
of the two randomly assigned on every trial. Similarly, high confidence was
expressed by the sentences “I’m sure it was on the [LEFT/RIGHT]!” and “It
was on the [LEFT/RIGHT], I’m sure!”. The use of two inverted sentences for
each confidence cue (“I’m sure” vs. “I think”) was to avoid over-repetition of
a single sentence and to balance the differences in emphasis that the English
language conveys when using the confidence cues (“I think” vs. “I’m sure”)
at the beginning or at the end of the sentence. The selection of LEFT or
RIGHT depended on the advisor’s choice and accuracy as described below.
After the advice was given, participants had unlimited time to update
their decision and confidence level using the same interface and input method
as used in the pre-advice period. The question “What is your final decision?”
appeared to prompt the update. The pre-advice confidence level remained on
the scale as a shaded marker to remind participants of their initial opinion.
Participants were allowed to stay in the same position along the scale, in-
crease and decrease their confidence, or even change their minds (i.e., chang-
ing interval along the scale). Again they confirmed their final decision by
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pressing spacebar. In the Feedback condition only, after the final decision
was confirmed, a high frequency error tone communicated whether the par-
ticipant’s final decision was incorrect. In the No-Feedback condition, a new
trial started immediately after participants had confirmed their final answer.
At the end of each block, a summary on the post-advice percentage accu-
racy of the participant (but not of the advisor) was provided to both groups.
Notice that advisor presentation was balanced within blocks so the feedback
participants received at the end of each block could not favor one advisor
over the others. Participants performed 500 trials divided in 10 experimen-
tal blocks. Prior to these, two initial blocks with a fifth advisor served as
practice and were removed from all the analyses. On each experimental block,
each advisor appeared ten times. Ten randomly selected trials within each
block were presented with a black silent silhouette and a post-advice decision
was not required (null trials). This was done to motivate participants to pro-
vide meaningful answers in their pre-advice answers on each trial and avoid
pre-advice random guessing. After every two experimental blocks, partici-
pants answered a brief questionnaire about their explicit opinions about the
four advisers. Four questions asked participants to directly rate on a scale
from 1 (Not at all) to 50 (Extremely) how much they thought each adviser
was accurate (Q1), confident (Q2), trustworthy (Q3) and influential on their
own choices (Q4) (see SI for complete description).
2.1.3 Manipulation
We orthogonally manipulated the average accuracy of the four advisors and
their confidence-to-accuracy calibration (Table 1). We kept the raw numbers
of confident and unconfident advice trials equal across advisors (50% high
confidence rate), to avoid people simply trusting the advisor who was the
most confident on average when objective feedback is not available (Sah et
al., 2013). We defined two accurate advisors by setting their accuracy to
80% and two inaccurate advisors by setting their accuracy to 60%. Then we
set the calibrated advisors to be always accurate whenever confident, and
the uncalibrated advisors’ confidence to be entirely unpredictive of accuracy.
This led to the profiles shown in Table 1. Calibration is a term used in
metacognitive studies indicating the strength of co-variation between con-
fidence judgments and accuracy. Here we quantify calibration as Type 2
AROC (A
′′
ROC), a method which does not make assumptions about the gen-
erative model of confidence (Fleming & Lau, 2014). Uncalibrated advisors
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both had an A′′ROC of 0.5, meaning that confidence was totally uninforma-
tive in predicting the advisor’s trial-level accuracy. Due to the experimental
design - in which overall accuracy of advisors was fixed at 60% or 80%, and
calibrated advisors were always correct when high in confidence - calibrated
advisors differed in their metacognitive sensitivity according to this metric
(Accurate Calibrated advisor A′′ROC = 0.72; Inaccurate Calibrated advisor
A′′ROC = 0.84).
We quantified the informational value of each advisor as the average in-
formation gain over possible advice encounters (see Supplementary Informa-
tion). The mean absolute information gain so computed was lowest for the
Inaccurate Uncalibrated advisor, intermediate for the Accurate Calibrated
and Accurate but Uncalibrated advisors and the highest for the Calibrated
but Inaccurate advisor (Table 1). This pattern can be intuitively understood
by looking at Table 1: Although the Inaccurate Calibrated advisor’s accuracy
rate is lower than the Accurate Calibrated advisor, outcomes can be better
predicted by her judgment. In particular, her judgments correlate strongly
positively with the correct answer when sure and strongly negatively when
unsure. On the contrary, when the Accurate Calibrated advisor is unsure
there is a much higher uncertainty about the final outcome. A related mea-
sure, the expected information gain, which takes into account the frequency
of each event (see SI), confirmed a similar pattern of objective advice value.
2.1.4 Exclusion criteria
An exclusion criterion was set a priori for staircase convergence. Partici-
pants who showed progressively increasing thresholds (i.e., increasing d values
across the experiment) were to be eliminated as this indicated that they were
randomly guessing. None of the participants had to be removed when this
criterion was applied to our sample. At the end of the experiment the average
difficulty parameter d across participants (pooled data) was 9.6± 2.81.
2.1.5 Three models of advisor reliability estimation
To identify the patterns of trust and influence that would result from adopt-
ing simple strategies for advice reliability estimation, we created models that
used different types of information to assign value to the advice received. To
mimic situations when feedback is provided on a trial-level basis, one model
used objective feedback to track each advisor’s reliability (the Accuracy strat-
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Advisors
Events Accurate Accurate Inaccurate Inaccurate
count Calibrated Uncalibrated Calibrated Uncalibrated
Incorrect
Confident 0 1 0 2
Incorrect
Unconfident 2 1 4 2
Correct
Unconfident 3 4 1 3
Correct
Confident 5 4 5 3
A′′ROC .72 .5 0.84 .5
IG 0.29 0.26 0.38 0.08
IGe 0.063 0.063 0.084 0.021
Table 1: Experiment 1 - Advisors profile. Values in the central section rep-
resent the number of times each event occurred over the course of a 50-trial
block (10 null trials, with no advisor, are not shown). Type 2 area under the
receiver operating characteristic curve A′′ROC represents the metacognitive
sensitivity or calibration of each advisor. Information gain IG and expected
information gain IGe quantify the informativeness of the advice received.
egy). Two different strategies can be followed to estimate advisors’ reliability
when feedback is absent. The first strategy is to use agreement rate with the
advisors as an indicator of the advisor’s good performance. Assuming that a
judge and advisor make independent decisions (below we explore cases where
this assumption is violated), then agreement rate will vary as a simple linear
function of an advisor’s accuracy, with a slope and maximum value that de-
pends on the judge’s own accuracy (Figure 1B). Thus, judges can distinguish
between better and worse advisors based on their agreement rates, but will
systematically underestimate the accuracy of all advisors to the extent that
their own task performance is imperfect.
However, people might solve the task using a more nuanced strategy that
leverages the internal sense of confidence as it covaries with objective accu-
racy (Henmon, 1911; Koriat, 2012b; Roediger III et al., 2012). An effective
13
strategy is to update trust more strongly from judgments when we are cer-
tain of our own answer than judgments where we are uncertain or guessing.
Suppose, for example, a judge selects the LEFT interval and estimates the
probability that they made the correct choice (i.e., their confidence) to be
80%. Suppose they now receive advice disagreeing with their judgment. As-
suming perfect calibration, the judge can then assign a 20% probability (i.e.,
1−0.80 = 0.20) that, on that trial, the advisor is correct (i.e., it is 80% likely
that they made an error); and the amount of learning that is possible about
the advisors, scales monotonically with confidence. In contrast, a Consensus
strategy, not using any subjective metacognitive information, would assign
to a disagreement trial a 0% chances that the advisor is correct. Return-
ing to Figure 1B, a judge learning via confidence-weighted agreement is not
confined to estimating advisor reliability according to a fixed linear function
that depends on their own accuracy, but rather can learn differentially across
trials according to their confidence. An interesting and valuable feature of
this approach is that it allows a judge to learn that an advisor is in fact more
accurate than they are themselves (something that is impossible with sim-
ple agreement-based updating), because good advisors are characterized by
agreeing most consistently with the judge in their confidently-made decisions
(i.e., those that are most likely to be correct).
Three different model variants (see Supplementary Information for de-
tails) account for the Feedback condition (Accuracy model), the No-Feedback
condition without metacognitive insight (Consensus model) and the No-
Feedback condition with metacognitive insight (Confidence model) respec-
tively. Trial-by-trial agreement, reported confidence and objective feedback
from Experiment 1 were used to estimate trust and influence that these model
variants would show with each advisor. As is shown below, the three model
variants make similar predictions when participants’ and advisors’ judgments
are independent (as in Experiment 1), but generate different results when
these initial judgments are correlated (as in Experiment 2-3).
2.2 Results
The first set of analyses were performed to show that participants are sensi-
tive to all advice dimensions that were manipulated here, namely accuracy
rate, calibration and advice confidence. Of particular interest is whether
these main effects vary as a function of feedback availability (i.e., the between-
participants manipulation). If the pattern of trust and influence changes as a
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function of feedback presence vs. absence, this would indicate that different
advice dimensions are made more or less salient by the presence of feedback.
These questions were investigated through the analysis of both explicit trust
ratings and implicit influence measure. Given that in all analyses time was
not a significant factor (e.g., when data were pooled across 10 successive
blocks to give a factor of time-on-task with 5 levels), the data from all blocks
were collapsed together.
2.2.1 Trust ratings
A first analysis focused on participants’ explicit ratings of advisor reliability
provided at the end of every second experimental block. Ratings were con-
verted into a unitary measure of trust, after preprocessing steps involving nor-
malisation, baseline correction and PCA as described in the Supplementary
Information. These steps aimed to remove confounds due to inter-individual
differences in responding, to advisor appearance and to question wording. In
both groups, questions one and four (regarding advisor accuracy and trust-
worthiness) scored highest on first PCA component. A mixed-design ANOVA
was run to test whether Feedback (between-participants), advisor Accuracy
(within-participants) and advisor Calibration (within-participants) affected
explicit trust ratings. Results showed significant main effects for advisor
Accuracy (F (1, 44) = 9.68, p = .003, η2G = 0.079) and advisor Calibration
(F (1, 44) = 12.32, p = .001, η2G = 0.076), but not for Feedback (F < 1). Par-
ticipants trusted accurate over inaccurate advice, and calibrated over uncal-
ibrated advice. No interaction term reached significance (F (1, 44) < 1.9, p >
.16). Importantly, neither of the main within-participants effects interacted
with Feedback, suggesting that participants were sensitive to the reliability
of the advice and that this sensitivity did not vary consistently according to
the presence or absence of feedback (Figure 2 A).
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Figure 2: Experiment 1 - Trust and influence patterns for humans and sim-
ulations. (a) Average trust ratings in the two feedback groups as a function
of advisor accuracy and calibration. Error bars represent s.e.m. (b) The
effect of advisor Accuracy, advice Confidence and Calibration, and Feedback
group on influence measure. Error bars represent s.e.m. (c) Average esti-
mated advisor reliability (θ) according to different variants of the Bayesian
model computed from the data of Experiment 1.16
We next ran planned 2-way ANOVAs separately for each feedback group,
with within-participant factors of advisor Accuracy and Calibration, to as-
sess whether the overall patterns described above were also reliable in each
group. In the Feedback group this analysis revealed reliable main effects of
both advisor Accuracy (F (1, 22) = 8.26, p = .008, η2G = .09) and advisor Cal-
ibration (F (1, 22) = 8.71, p = .007, η2G = 0.12), but no reliable interaction
(F (1, 22) = 1.24, p = .27, η2G = .02).
In the No Feedback group, although comparable numerical trends were
apparent, neither main effect of Accuracy (F (1, 22) = 3.42, p = .07, η2G =
0.06) and Calibration (F (1, 22) = 4.03, p = .05, η2G = 0.04) reached statistical
significance. The interaction term was not significant (F < 1).
2.2.2 Influence
Figure 2B plots averaged advisor influence, the implicit measure of learn-
ing about advice reliability. Influence was quantified as the signed differ-
ence between post and pre-advice confidence (Equation 3, Supplementary
Information) and represents the shift in confidence observed after social in-
formation. Influence results were analysed using a mixed-design ANOVA
that included the same factors of Feedback presence (between-participants),
advisor Accuracy and Calibration (both within-participants) as in the trust
analysis. For the influence measure an additional within-participants fac-
tor was included according to the Confidence expressed by the advisor on
a given trial. While both advisor’s Accuracy and Calibration are “trait”
variables, advice Confidence is a trial-by-trial “state” variable (with val-
ues low vs. high). This analysis revealed significant main effects of ad-
visor Accuracy (F (1, 44) = 14.80, p < .001, η2G = 0.02) and Calibration
(F (1, 44) = 15.84, p < .001, η2G = 0.01), mirroring the observed effects
of advisor reliability seen for explicitly expressed trust. A reliable main
effect of advisor Confidence (F (1, 44) = 55.82, p < .001, η2G = .12) indi-
cated that more confidently expressed advice had greater influence. There
was a significant interaction between Calibration and advisor Confidence
(F (1, 44) = 9.62, p = .003, η2G = 0.004) indicating that the effect of confi-
dently (vs. unconfidently) expressed advice was greater for calibrated ad-
visors than uncalibrated advisors. The analysis also revealed a significant
3-way interaction between advisor Accuracy, Calibration and Confidence
(F (1, 44) = 4.75, p = .03, η2G = 8.5e− 04), indicating that the two-way inter-
action between Calibration and Confidence was larger for inaccurate advisors
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than accurate ones. Importantly, there was no reliable main effect of Feed-
back (F < 1), nor any reliable interaction between Feedback and any other
main effects (all Fs(1, 44) < 1.1, ps > .29) suggesting again that participants’
sensitivity to advisor reliability, here expressed in terms of the influence of
their advice, did not depend significantly on the provision of trial-by-trial
feedback.
Although we observed no reliable effects of feedback, we ran planned
follow-up ANOVAs for each feedback group separately to assess whether
the overall patterns described above were also reliable in each group. In
the Feedback group, this analysis revealed significant effects on influence for
advisor Accuracy (F (1, 22) = 8.23, p = .008, η2G = 0.02) and Calibration
(F (1, 22) = 6.35, p = .01, η2G = .03), and advice Confidence (F (1, 22) =
32.92, p < .001, η2G = 0.18). A two-way interaction was found between Cali-
bration and Confidence (F (1, 22) = 7.37, p = .01, η2G = .008) but not between
Accuracy and Calibration nor Accuracy and Confidence (both F < 1). As
shown in Figure 2B, the interaction term reflects the fact that the average
influence difference between calibrated and uncalibrated advisors was mainly
shown for highly confident advice compared to uncertain advice. Finally a
reliable three-way interaction between Accuracy, Calibration and Confidence
(F (1, 22) = 8.32, p = .008, η2G = .003) suggests that such interaction was
stronger for inaccurate advisors than accurate ones (Figure 2B).
A corresponding ANOVA on influence measures in the No-Feedback group
revealed main effects of advisor Accuracy (F (1, 22) = 6.87, p = .01, η2G = .02)
and Calibration (F (1, 22) = 9.48, p = .005, η2G = .01), and advice Confidence
(F (1, 22) = 22.95, p < .001, η2G = .07). The results show that participants
were more influenced by Accurate and Calibrated advisors, and by Confident
advice compared to uncertain advice, paralleling the effects observed when
feedback was provided. None of the two-way interaction terms reached sig-
nificance (Accuracy rate x Calibration: F (1, 22) = 1.35, p > .25, η2G = .001;
Accuracy rate x advice Confidence: F (1, 22) = 2.90, p = .1, η2G = .002; Cal-
ibration x advice Confidence: F (1, 22) = 2.59, p = .12, η2G = .001), although
numerically there were greater effects of confidence for calibrated advisors
(as observed in the Feedback condition). The three-way interaction between
Accuracy, Calibration and Confidence was not significant (F < 1).
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2.2.3 Model results
The three model variants were run based on the actual series of each par-
ticipants decisions and (where appropriate) their associated confidence, and
the advice they received and (where appropriate) its accuracy, in Experiment
1. We looked at how the different variants of the model fared in evaluating
different advisors’ profiles based on this input. The aim of the following anal-
yses was to verify how the pattern of final model’s trust (θ) in each advisor
differed when different pieces of information were used to compute it. The
model is not intended as a mechanistic description of participants’ behaviour.
Instead, it aims to show that a simple reliability estimation rule will develop
differentiated patterns of trust across advisors depending on what types of
information it relies upon. For this analysis, data from the Feedback and
No-Feedback groups were pooled together to increase statistical power, as
the presence of feedback did not affect the variables that model’s variants
were based on, namely advisors’ accuracy, agreement rates and participant’s
pre-advice confidence ratings respectively.
The model’s estimates of advisor reliability (θ parameter) can be used
to predict nominal confidence changes using Bayes rule (see Supplementary
Information). Confidence changes predicted by the model could have been
used to plot the model’s implicit trust in the advisors in a manner similar to
what already shown with the behavioral data. However, contrary to θ values,
confidence changes are an implicit measure of trust and they are affected not
only by the value assigned to an advisor but also by the pre-advice confidence
of that trial. Thus, although the two measures are related, θ represents a
direct measure of the model’s belief about advisors’ reliability (a trial-by-trial
measure that is not available in the human data).
Each model variant’s final θ values - i.e., the model’s advisor reliability esti-
mates on the last trial of the experiment - were analyzed using a 2x2 repeated
measures ANOVA with factors of advisor Accuracy (high vs low) and Cali-
bration (high vs. low). Scaling factors were applied to agreement to take into
account the fact that in this experiment advisors provided a confidence judg-
ment with their advice. The Accuracy variant is, in this experiment, fully pre-
determined by the advisors’ set accuracy rates and thus no statistical analysis
were run due to the absence of variability across participants. We plot how-
ever its trust value θ for visual reference as it shows that when the model is
provided with information about the objective performance of the participant
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(and thus of the advisors), it is able to distinguish advisors both in terms of
their Accuracy rate and their confidence Calibration. The difference between
calibrated and uncalibrated advisors is larger for inaccurate than accurate
advisors, due to the weights used to convey advice confidence (Figure 2C). In
the absence of externally given objective feedback, both the Consensus vari-
ant - which estimates advisors’ reliability by assuming that advisors are cor-
rect whenever they agree with the participants own first decision, and wrong
otherwise - and the Confidence variant - which uses agreement as a proxy for
feedback like the Consensus variant, but scales them by pre-advice confidence
- show greater trust for Accurate (F (1, 45) > 165.84, p < .001, η2G = .44) and
Calibrated (F (1, 45) = 32.70, p < .001, η2G = .13) advisors compared to inac-
curate or uncalibrated ones. Neither variant showed a significant interaction
between the two factors (F (1, 45) < 2.65, p > .11, η2G = .01). Notice that
advisors were not constrained to agree with the participant a pre-determined
amount of times, thus explaining the variability observed across participants
according to the specific sequence of decisions they made and advice they
received.
Taken together, these modeling results show that simple computations
of advisor reliability perform well at this task even when trial-level feedback
is absent, effectively capturing key patterns of trust observed in the human
data across feedback conditions. For the task used in Experiment 1, the three
variants do not make contradictory predictions on which advisors should be
trusted. In particular the two No-Feedback variants (that base trust on sim-
ple agreement, or agreement weighted by confidence) cannot be disentangled
using the data collected from this experiment, with both showing sensitivity
to both accuracy and calibration of an advisor.
2.3 Discussion
In this experiment we tested whether participants would distinguish among
advisors with differing profiles, and whether patterns of trust and influence
would vary according to the availability of objective feedback. Across con-
ditions, participants expressed greater trust in, and were more influenced
by, advice characterised by high confidence, high accuracy and high cali-
bration. Although the first two dimensions are not a surprise (Sniezek &
Van Swol, 2001), the fact that participants also value advice calibration is
less well documented. Tenney et al. (2007) showed, in mock jury decisions,
that confident but inaccurate witnesses are discredited more than equally
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inaccurate but less confident ones. Sah et al. (2013) further confirmed that
when feedback is readily available, confident but incorrect advice backfires on
an advisor’s reputation. However, when feedback was not available the same
authors found evidence for a confidence heuristic whereby confident advisors
were more influential regardless of accuracy (Price & Stone, 2004).
The current study extends this previous work in two respects. First, the
behavioral as well as the simulation findings highlight the value in using in-
formation regarding agreement and confidence in social learning: Although
the patterns of trust and influence were not identical across Feedback and
No-Feedback conditions, no consistent (statistically reliable) differences were
observed, and overall the results indicate that people can learn useful dis-
tinguishing characteristics (accuracy and calibration) even in the absence of
objective feedback, and even when average advisor confidence is kept con-
stant (Price & Stone, 2004; Sah et al., 2013). Second, we replicate in a highly
controlled perceptual task setting the finding that judges value advisor’s con-
fidence calibration. By allowing repeated interactions with the same advisors
and by fixing advisors’ average expressed confidence, the current paradigm
was able to quantify advice calibration and show that people value it over
and above the overall level of confidence with which advice is expressed.
Simulation results based on straightforward implementations of learning
strategies - estimating advice reliability according to objective feedback,
agreement, or agreement weighted by confidence - were consistent with the
empirical results in showing similar patterns of trust across advisors regard-
less of the presence or absence of objective feedback. Thus, calculating agree-
ment rates and weighting agreement by subjective confidence can be effec-
tive heuristics for estimating advisor reliability when objective feedback is
absent. The reason for this is that both agreement and subjective confidence
covary with accuracy. Thus, both are useful cues, and in the present data
the two are difficult to disentangle. To disambiguate predictions of the two
hypotheses, and to explore crucial limitations in the use of agreement and
confidence in estimating advisor reliability, the following two experiments
included advice that was not independent of participants’ initial decisions.
Instead, advice varied systematically to allow orthogonal manipulation of
(1) advisors’ agreement and accuracy rates and (2) advisors’ agreement rates
and subjective confidence. While Experiment 1 showed the normative value
of using such heuristics when advice is independent from a judge’s initial de-
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cision, in these experiments we explored the impact of these heuristics when
advice is not independent.
3 Experiment 2
As shown by the Consensus model, the frequency of agreement with the ad-
vice might be used as a cue to the reliability of the advice, if observations from
individual observers are independent. This observation echoes the Wisdom of
Crowds (WoC) effect (Galton, 1907; Surowiecki, 2004), whereby aggregation
of individual opinions results in better-than-expert performance. Wisdom
of crowds is often cited as the archetype of collective intelligence (Krause,
Ruxton, & Krause, 2010). The classic explanation of the effect is that in-
dividual judgments are the sum of a signal component and random noise.
Averaging individual judgments has the effect of enhancing signal by aver-
aging out noise, with a similar mechanism as repeated measures in statistics
(Armstrong, 2001).
However, people’s judgments are rarely independent and distorted only
by random noise (Koriat, 2012b; Krause et al., 2010): We watch the same
news, browse the same websites and are affected by the same cognitive bi-
ases as others we interact with. Thus, there may be dependencies between
judgments. One source of dependence between opinions is the use of similar
cognitive heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Other sources can arise
from using similar strategies to sample information from the environment
(Vandormael, Herce Castan˜o´n, Balaguer, Li, & Summerfield, 2017), being
exposed to similar signals (Kao & Couzin, 2014; Kao, Miller, Torney, Hart-
nett, & Couzin, 2014) or belonging to the same network clique (Jamieson &
Cappella, 2008; Jasny, Waggle, & Fisher, 2015; Sunstein, 2001). Crowds are
known to be susceptible to large error cascades (Le Bon, 1895; Mackay, 1841),
economic bubbles (De Martino, ODoherty, Ray, Bossaerts, & Camerer, 2013),
polarisation (Myers & Lamm, 1976) and groupthink (Janis, 1972; Turner &
Pratkanis, 1998). An open question is whether these examples of error mag-
nification are due to a lack of judgment independence. Dependencies in error
sources may lead to greater consensus among observers but to a decorrela-
tion from actual accuracy - e.g., by agreeing on errors (Koriat, 2012b). In
the context of advice, the focus of the present research, opinions and sug-
gestions might be framed in relation to the person we are advising whether
accidentally or deliberately. This framing will influence the extent to which
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opinions agree or disagree with each other, and thus the information carried
by other people’s consensus. As a first exploration of biased advice scenarios,
we thus investigated whether in these contexts people trust accurate advisors
or advisors who tend to agree.
Specifically, advisor accuracy was manipulated so that two advisors were
on average highly accurate (around 80% accuracy) and two advisors were
on average relatively inaccurate (around 60% accuracy). Orthogonally, ad-
visor agreement rate with the participant’s judgment was manipulated so as
to create two advisors who agreed with the participant frequently (around
80% of trials) and two advisors who tended to have a lower agreement rate
with the participant (around 60%). This created an advisor who is highly
accurate and tends to agree with the participant, an advisor who is highly
accurate but tends to disagree with the participant, an advisor who is not
very accurate but still tends to agree with the participant, and an advisor
who is neither accurate or agreeing. The two intermediate profiles are an im-
portant test case where the two dimensions of accuracy and agreement work
against each other. The agreeing but inaccurate advisor represent some-
one who shares biases with the participant and so makes similar (correlated)
mistakes. The accurate but disagreeing advisor instead represents an advisor
who uses different information so is accurate and tends to be correct when
the participant makes mistakes and vice versa. Knowing what advice char-
acteristics are made salient by the presence of feedback can shed light on the
mechanisms of trust formation and advice influence.
3.1 Methods
3.1.1 Participants
The experiment included 46 participants equally divided between the two
feedback groups (37 females in total, 18 of whom were in the Feedback group,
mean age: 21.63±3.02). Participants were recruited through Oxford Univer-
sity’s online recruitment platform and local news advertisement. Participants
were compensated either with money (10£/hour) or course credits. All par-
ticipants provided informed consent before the experiment. All procedures
were approved by the local ethical committee.
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3.1.2 Paradigm
The overall design was very similar to Experiment 1, with advice provided
and its impact measured in the context of the same dot-count perceptual
decision task. Participants performed ten blocks of 44 trials each. In this
experiment, advice was presented in the form of a binary judgment, expressed
by the sentences “I think it was on the [LEFT/RIGHT]” and “It was on
the [LEFT/RIGHT], I think”, depending on advisor’s opinion and random
selection of one of the two sentences across trials (i.e., there was no across-
trial manipulation of advisor confidence). For participants in the Feedback
group only, after the final choice was confirmed, a high frequency beep sound
(duration 140 ms) was played whenever the participant’s final choice was
incorrect.
At the end of every second block, a computer-based questionnaire was
presented to participants prompting them to evaluate the four advisors on
a 50-point scale (1=“Not at all”, 50=“Extremely”). The questions were
the same as those used in Experiment 1 apart from question two (question
about advisor’s confidence) that was replaced with a question about advisor
likeability, to account for the advisors not expressing confidence along with
their judgments in this experiment.
In each block, the presentation of the four advisors was randomly shuffled
across trials, with each advisor appearing exactly ten times. Four additional
trials were randomly inserted into the block and served as null trials, where
a silent silhouette was displayed instead, to encourage participants to reg-
ister meaningful initial confidence judgments as well as final (post-advice)
judgments. The difficulty of the first-order task was again titrated to a tar-
get level of 70.7% accuracy using a 2-down-1-up staircase method. Prior to
commencing the 10 experimental blocks, participants completed two practice
blocks, with ten practice trials each, with a fifth advisor. Practice trials were
removed from all the analyses.
3.1.3 Manipulation
To disentangle agreement rate from the accuracy of the advisors, the prob-
ability of agreement conditional on the participant’s choice accuracy was
manipulated. Through the staircase procedure it was expected that all par-
ticipants would converge to an accuracy level of about 70%. This enabled us
to manipulate advisor accuracy and agreement rate by pre-determining the
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probability of agreement after a participant’s error or a participant’s correct
response. Both accuracy and agreement were manipulated to have two levels
(high=80% and low=60%). This gave rise to the four advisor profiles defined
in Table 2. Probabilities are expressed as a fraction over the number of par-
ticipants’ expected correct (7) and incorrect (3) judgments, over the number
of encounters with one advisor during one block (10).
Advisors
High Accuracy High Acc. Low Acc. Low Acc.
High Agreement Low Agr. High Agr. Low Agr.
p(Agr|Cors) 6.5/7 5.5/7 5.5/7 4.5/7
p(Agr|Incs) 1.5/3 0.5/3 2.5/3 1.5/3
Expected
Acc. rate 80% 80% 60% 60%
Expected
Agr. rate 80% 60% 80% 60%
IG 0.28 0.27 0.03 0.06
IGe 0.09 0.13 0.01 0.03
Table 2: Experiment 2 advisors’ profiles. Expected accuracy and agreement
rates of different advisors are disentangled by manipulating the probability
of the advice agreeing with the participant, conditional on the participant’s
accuracy. In the table, probabilities are expressed as a fraction of the number
of participants’ expected correct (7) and incorrect (3) judgments, during the
number of encounters with one advisor (10) in a single experimental block.
Information gain and expected information gain - IG and IGe respectively -
indicate average informational value of the advice, computed as information
gain and expected information gain respectively (see Supplementary Infor-
mation).
The dissociation between accuracy and agreement was possible by mak-
ing the accurate but disagreeing advisor disagree more often on trials when
the participant had made an incorrect initial decision (meaning a correct
response for the advisor). Similarly, an inaccurate but agreeing advisor was
created by making the advisor more likely to agree when the participant’s
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initial judgment was incorrect. For the two advisors for whom accuracy and
agreement work in the same direction - i.e., accurate and agreeing vs. inac-
curate and disagreeing - it can be expected that participants will favor the
former over the latter. However when accuracy and agreement pattern work
in opposite directions - as is the case for the agreeing but inaccurate and the
disagreeing but accurate advisors - it can be expected that the availability of
external feedback will favor the accurate advisor in the Feedback group but
not in the No-Feedback group.
Similar to Experiment 1, we used conditional probabilities and the partic-
ipants’ expected accuracy to compute the informational value of each advisor
(Table 2). Advisors’ mean absolute information gain IG and expected infor-
mation gain IGe were computed as in the previous experiment. Contrary to
Experiment 1, however, advisors did not express different levels of confidence.
This created only two possible situations on each trial, either agreement or
disagreement. As can be seen in Table 2, information gain was highest for the
accurate advisors and the lowest for the inaccurate but agreeing advisor. This
advisor is in fact counter-intuitively anti-predictive of the correct answer: In
contrast with the other advisors, this advisor’s probability of agreement is
higher when the participant’s initial judgment is incorrect than when it is
correct. Thus, an optimal observer would decrease their confidence when
in agreement and increase it when in disagreement with this advisor. For
all other advisors, agreement should increase confidence and disagreement
should decrease it.
The same two measures of interest as in Experiment 1 - explicit trust and
implicit influence - were calculated. Similarly, the three model variants were
run on the new behavioral dataset. For pairwise comparisons, both p-values
and Bayes factors are reported. Bayes factors are reported using the notation
suggested in Dienes and Mclatchie (2017). The priors on the effect sizes to
compute Bayes factors are informed by results of Experiment 1 (while no
priors were available for Experiment 1).
3.1.4 Exclusion criteria
The first two experimental blocks were removed from the analysis to allow
the staircase procedure to fully adapt to each individual’s threshold. This
was necessary given that our manipulation was heavily dependent on the
expected accuracy rate of the participants. A further exclusion criterion
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was set to exclude all participants whose threshold never converged, which
suggests a random response strategy. None of the participants had to be
removed on the basis of this criterion. The perceptual task difficulty d (dot
difference between boxes) after staircasing was 9.93± 2.96 (pooled data).
3.2 Results
A first set of analyses explored the effect of our manipulation on the trust and
influence measures as a function of whether objective trial-level feedback was
provided. In particular we are interested in whether any of the manipulated
within-participants factors (advice agreement rate and accuracy) interacted
with feedback presence.
3.2.1 Trust ratings
A mixed-design ANOVA was run on explicit trust ratings with feedback
group as a between-participants factor and advisor accuracy (low vs. high)
and agreement rate (low vs. high) as within-participants factors. This anal-
ysis revealed significant main effects for both accuracy (F (1, 44) = 8.36, p =
.005, η2G = .06) and agreement rates (F (1, 44) = 22.52, p < .001, η
2
G = .1),
but not for feedback (F < 1). A significant interaction was found between
feedback and accuracy (F (1, 44) = 8.41, p = .005, η2G = .06) but not between
feedback and agreement rate (F (1, 44) = 1.88, p = .17, η2G = .01) or between
agreement and accuracy (F < 1), nor a significant three-way interaction
(F < 1). The results suggest that in their explicit ratings of trust, partici-
pants reported on average to prefer advice coming from accurate sources and
sources that tended to agree with their own judgments. Importantly, how-
ever, the effect of accuracy was modulated by the presence of feedback, with
effects of advisor accuracy apparent only in the Feedback condition (Figure
3A).
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Figure 3: Experiment 2 - Trust ratings and influence for human participants
and simulations. (a) Average trust ratings in the two feedback groups, di-
vided by advisor accuracy rate and agreement rate. Error bars represent
s.e.m. (b) Influence that advice had on participants’ opinions in the two
feedback groups and divided by advisor accuracy rate and agreement rate.
Error bars represent s.e.m.(c)
We then looked at trust ratings in the two feedback conditions individu-
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ally. A repeated measures ANOVA on trust ratings from the Feedback group
revealed significant effects of both advisor’s Accuracy (F (1, 22) = 21.36, p <
.001, η2G = .20) and Agreement rate (F (1, 22) = 5.62, p = .02, η
2
G = .06), but
no significant interaction (F < 1). The effect of accuracy was much stronger
than the one observed for agreement as indicated by the generalised eta
squared values (Bakeman, 2005). Nonetheless, it is notable that agreement
had a significant effect on trust even when controlling for accuracy.
A corresponding ANOVA on trust rating data from the No-Feedback
group found that Agreement rate (F (1, 22) = 18.91, p < .001, η2G = .18) but
not Accuracy (F < 1) affected participants’ explicit reliability judgments.
No significant interaction was found between the two factors (F < 1). These
findings suggest that when feedback was not directly available to estimate
partners’ reliability, participants expressed greater trust in agreeing advisors
over disagreeing ones, but not in accurate advisors over inaccurate ones.
3.2.2 Influence
The next analysis focused on influence, as an implicit measure of trust. A
mixed-design ANOVA on the influence measure was run with feedback as a
between-participants factor and advisor Accuracy (low vs. high) and Agree-
ment rate (low vs. high) as within-participants factors. This analysis re-
vealed significant main effects of advisor Accuracy (F (1, 44) = 14.79, p <
.001, η2G = .04) and Agreement rate (F (1, 44) = 13.91, p < .001, η
2
G = .03),
and a non-significant interaction between these factors with a numerical
trend for participants to be more influenced when feedback was not available
(F (1, 44) = 3.19, p = .08, η2G = .04)(Figure 3B). Importantly, no significant
interactions were found between Accuracy and Feedback (F < 1), between
Agreement and Feedback (F (1, 44) = 2.01, p = .16, η2G = .005) and between
Accuracy and Agreement rate (F < 1). No significant three-way interaction
was found either (F < 1). The results show that participants were more
influenced by accurate advisors and by advisors characterized by high agree-
ment rates with their own judgments. Importantly, however, the effects did
not interact reliably with feedback, suggesting that similar effects were found
in the two condition groups independently of feedback availability. We then
looked at individual pattern of results within each experimental group.
A two-way ANOVA on influence measures in the Feedback group showed
significant effects for both advisor’s Accuracy (F (1, 22) = 12.71, p = .001, η2G =
.06) and Agreement rate (F (1, 22) = 5.81, p = .02, η2G = .01). No significant
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interaction was observed between the two factors (F < 1). As expected,
when looking at opinion change, participants’ opinions were more affected
by accurate advisors over inaccurate ones. Interestingly, mirroring effects
observed in explicitly rated trust, participants were affected by advisors who
tended to agree with their own judgment, although feedback indicated equiv-
alent accuracy rates for pairs of advisors characterized by different agreement
rates.
When looking at the No-Feedback condition, a similar pattern emerged.
A 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA on influence showed significant main ef-
fects for both advisor’s Agreement rates (F (1, 22) = 8.60, p = .007, η2G = .06)
and Accuracy (F (1, 22) = 4.09, p = .05, η2G = .02), although the effect size
of Agreement was the greater of the two. No significant interaction was
observed (F < 1). Thus, in the No-Feedback group, the results suggest a
dissociation between what people reported in the questionnaires, with higher
trust reported for agreeing advisors regardless of accuracy, and people’s per-
formance in the task, where influence showed effects of both accuracy and
agreement rate.
3.2.3 Model results
The models described above were applied to data from Experiment 2, to
understand whether the Consensus and Confidence model variants behaved
differently in scenarios where advice accuracy and advice agreement rate are
dissociated. Each model variant was used to provide an estimate of trust in
each advisor based on each participant’s expressed confidence, experienced
advice and, in the case of the Accuracy model, advice objective accuracy.
In this experiment, advisors did not express a confidence judgment about
their opinions. Thus all model variants could be simplified by not taking
into account advice confidence (see Supplementary Information for details).
Given that we are not trying to fit the model to the human data, but
only observing how trust patterns change as a function of the information
fed to the model, data from the two feedback groups were pooled together.
Trial-by-trial pre-advice confidence and advice were input to each of the
three model variants and resulting θ-values for each advisor were compared
(Figure 3C). Both the Accuracy and the Confidence models’ θ values show a
significant effect of Accuracy (F (1, 45) > 8.85, p < .005, η2G > .05), while the
Consensus model only showed a non significant marginal effect (F (1, 45) =
3.22, p = .07, eta2G = .02). Both the Confidence and Consensus models show
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a significant effect of Agreement (F (1, 45) > 434.7, p < .001, η2G > .71), but
no reliable interaction between the two factors (F (1, 45) < 2.04, p > .15, η2G <
.007).
Not surprisingly, the results suggest that when provided with objective
feedback on trial-by-trial performance, a simplified model of reliability es-
timation (Accuracy variant) was able to dissociate advisors based on their
accuracy, but did not differentiate based on advisors’ agreement profile. On
the contrary, human data suggest that agreement influences trust even when
trial-by-trial feedback is provided. More surprisingly, a model without access
to objective accuracy but endowed with metacognitive insight (Confidence
variant) was also able to discriminate between equally agreeing but differently
accurate partners. As shown in Table 2, the accurate agreeing advisor tends
to agree more often than the inaccurate agreeing advisor when the partici-
pant is objectively correct (6.5 times out of 7 against 5.5 times out of 7) and
less often when the participant is objectively wrong (1.5 thirds against 2.5
thirds). Trials when participants’ initial judgment is correct are usually asso-
ciated with greater confidence ratings (Fleming & Lau, 2014; Henmon, 1911;
Koriat, 2012b), thus a strategy of reliability estimation relying on confidence
can exploit this covariation to detect differences in accuracy, notwithstanding
equal agreement rates.
3.3 Discussion
Experiment 2 orthogonally manipulated the agreement rate and accuracy of
advice presented to participants. Results show different behaviors according
to whether or not participants (and the model) were provided with trial-by-
trial feedback. Human participants, but not the model (Accuracy variant),
showed an effect of agreement even when given objective feedback on the ad-
visors performance. When feedback was removed, participants’ explicit trust
reports showed an effect of agreement but not of accuracy, while their im-
plicit confidence changes showed both effects. Similarly, a Confidence model
distinguished both dimensions of advice, namely agreement and accuracy,
by scaling agreement with internal metacognitive signals. On the contrary,
a Consensus model showed a strong preference for agreeing advisors and
showed only limited evidence of being able to distinguish accurate from in-
accurate advisors.
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Unsurprisingly, advisor accuracy affected reported trust and influence mea-
sure in the Feedback group (Behrens et al., 2008). The finding that these
participants also showed an agreement effect is, however, more surprising.
The finding seems to suggest that agreement is perceived as a strong indica-
tor of the reliability of advice, independent of the actual underlying accuracy.
A possible explanation for this effect is that participants show a confirma-
tion bias (Nickerson, 1998) by which confirming evidence (in this case an
agreement trial) is weighted more than disproving evidence (a disagreement
trial). The Accuracy model created to describe trust formation in cases when
feedback is provided by the experimenter is thus not enough to describe par-
ticipants’ behavior as it fails to show a mediating effect of agreement. A
combination of accuracy and internal confidence could perhaps explain the
mechanism giving rise to participants’ actual behavior.
When feedback was unavailable, both participants’ implicit (influence) and
explicit (trust) behavior is dominated by the agreement rate of the advisors
rather than by their accuracy. One possibility is that the preprocessing per-
formed on original questionnaire ratings through PCA to aggregate different
questions together (see Supplementary Information) caused a loss of the in-
formation originally communicated by participants. This hypothesis was
discarded after obtaining similar results when including only the first trust
question (Q1), which directly asked participants to rate how “accurate” each
advisor was. The dominance of agreement over accuracy might have resulted
in a halo-dumping effect (Clark & Lawless, 1994) whereby, when prompted
to discriminate among advisors, participants used only the most accessible
dimension. Nevertheless, an effect of advisor accuracy was still observed in
implicit confidence change behavior - and, as predicted by the Confidence
model - suggesting that some proximal cues to accuracy were available to
them. It is unlikely that this cue was the agreement of the advice, as this
dimension was orthogonal to accuracy by design. A more plausible hypoth-
esis is that participants accumulated over time some internal uncertainty
quantity (e.g. confidence) for each advisor separately.
Collectively, these results demonstrate that agreement is a crucial cue to
reliability, such that its effects are seen even when objective feedback is pro-
vided. The fact that agreement was such a strong predictor of advice impact
on participants’ opinions made it difficult to isolate the effect of internal con-
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fidence on advice evaluation. Experiment 3 was designed to prevent this issue
and to match all advisors in terms of agreement and accuracy rates, while at
the same time varying the amount of shared information and bias between
the advisors and the participants. It provides a direct test of the hypothesis
that confidence judgments are used to make useful inferences about others.
4 Experiment 3
Experiment 3 aimed to provide stronger evidence that subjective confidence
contributes to the formation of judgments about advice reliability. In this
experiment, we directly manipulated the probability that advice would agree
with the participant’s initial judgment, conditional on their initial confidence
in that judgment. Three advisors were created by making advisors’ judg-
ments more or less biased towards the participant’s confidence judgments
in trials when the participant’s initial judgment is correct: (1) an unbiased
advisor who tended to agree with the participant’s choice about 70% of the
time, independent of participant’s confidence; (2) a bias-sharing advisor who
tended to agree with the participant’s initial choice particularly when the
participant is confident; (3) an “anti-bias” advisor who tended to agree with
the participant particularly when the participant is unsure. The labeling of
the advisors in terms of bias does not reflect an actual bias manipulation,
but rather reflects our aim to capture the patterns of agreement that would
result from shared biases with the advisors. The manipulation is a special
case of the general idea of judgment dependence among observers that was
described above. This design is intended to capture a property that may
hold in many real-world situations, where the opinions and choices of indi-
viduals are not independent, but instead are correlated (e.g., reflecting their
shared reliance on common sources of information). Crucially, the effects of
agreement-by-confidence were studied while matching the overall agreement
rate and accuracy of the different advisors.
4.1 Methods
4.1.1 Participants
50 participants were tested and divided in the two experimental groups. Due
to participants failing to attend or complete sessions, numbers across groups
were unbalanced with 24 participants in the No-Feedback group and 26 in
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the Feedback group. Participants were recruited through local advertisement
and the Oxford University online recruitment platform. Prior the start of
the experiment all participants signed a consent form approved by the local
ethical committee. Volunteers were compensated for their time via monetary
compensation (10 £/hour) or course credits.
4.1.2 Paradigm
The experiment consisted of 12 experimental blocks of 35 trials each, with
each of the three advisors seen on 10 trials and with 5 null trials. The per-
ceptual task was the same as for Experiments 1 and 2. Display parameters,
input modality and stages within a trial remained unaltered. A different
confidence rating scale was used in this experiment, because the 10-point
scale used in Experiments 1 and 2 would not allow us to distinguish fine
gradations in confidence that are needed in this design. Thus, in this experi-
ment, participants rated their confidence on a 100-point scale (50 points per
interval, left vs. right). All participants’ stimuli were titrated to converge
to 70.7% decision accuracy. Two blocks of 25 trials served as the practice
blocks and used a fourth practice advisor. Similar to Experiments 1 and 2,
trust questionnaires were presented every two block and questionnaire data
went through the same preprocessing pipeline.
4.1.3 Manipulation
The advice profiles of the three advisors were manipulated so that all advi-
sors showed on average the same level of accuracy and agreement rate with
the participants’ judgments. The pattern of agreement was manipulated,
however, such that the three different advisors’ likelihood of agreement with
the participant varied according to the participant’s initial confidence, as
described in Table 3 and illustrated in Figure 4.
The distribution of the participant’s pre-advice confidence judgments was
divided into three confidence bins: the low, middle and high confidence bin,
which include 30%, 40% and 30% of the trials, respectively. On trials where
the participant’s pre-advice judgment was incorrect all advisors had a proba-
bility of agreement of 30% independent of the participant’s confidence level.
On trials where the participant’s judgment was correct, however, the three
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advisors had different agreement patterns. An unbiased advisor had a prob-
ability of agreement of 70% independent of the participant’s confidence. A
bias-sharing advisor was defined as agreeing around 80% of the time when
the participant was highly confident and 60% of the time when s/he was
uncertain. An anti-bias advisor was designed to agree 60% of the time
when the participant was highly confident and 80% of the time when s/he
was uncertain. Importantly, however all advisors had an equal chance of
agreement when the participant’s pre-advice confidence fell in the middle
bin (70%). This ensured that all advisors were matched across all trials in
terms of average agreement rate (0.7 ∗ 0.7 + 0.3 ∗ 0.3 = 0.58) and accuracy
(0.7 ∗ 0.7 + 0.3 ∗ 0.7 = 0.7).
By limiting analyses to trials within the intermediate confidence bin, we
could compare advisors on trials that were matched for confidence and a priori
likelihood of advice agreement. For example, asymmetric confidence changes
in agreement and disagreement and larger advice influence in uncertain trials
might contribute to advisor-specific distortions in the influence measure, if
all trials were pooled together. The confidence reference distribution used
to assign trials to the low, middle and high confidence bins was first set up
on the basis of each participants confidence ratings in the first two practice
blocks. The reference distribution was updated after each block to reflect
the distribution of confidence judgments provided during the previous two
blocks. This precaution was taken to take into account possible shifts of




p(Agree|Corrects, Confidenceslow) 60% 70% 80%
p(Agree|Corrects, Confidencesmid) 70% 70% 70%
p(Agree|Corrects, Confidenceshigh) 80% 70% 60%
p(Agree|Incorrects) 30% 30% 30%
AUC(IGe) 14.63 14.74 15.78
Table 3: Experiment 3 advisors’ profiles. Agreement probability of different
advisors is manipulated conditional on the participant’s pre-advice confidence
and accuracy. This manipulation allowed to create three different advisors
who were matched in terms of agreement rate and accuracy, but who dif-
fered in terms of information as quantified by AUC(IGe), namely the area
under the expected information gain curve (see Supplementary Information
for details).
Although average accuracy and agreement rates were matched across ad-
visors, the information that participants could gain by receiving advice was
not. In the present experiment, computing advisor’s information gain from
prior knowledge of their conditional probability was not possible as this was
dependent on each participant’s individual confidence distribution. However,
according to a Bayesian normative model, greater changes along the confi-
dence scale should take place when subjective initial confidence is low, and
lower shifts should be observed when initial confidence is high. The anti-bias
advisor is in this respect in the good position of giving supporting evidence
(agreement) when it is needed the most (low subjective initial confidence).
The bias-sharing advisor on the contrary tends to agree when their judg-
ments are less effective (high subjective initial confidence). The intuition
that the anti-bias advisor was the most informative was confirmed using a
numerical simulation based on the nominal confidence updates of an ideal
Bayesian observer performing the task (see Supplementary Information).
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Figure 4: Experimental manipulation of Experiment 3. The probability of
advisor’s agreement conditional on participant’s accuracy and confidence was
manipulated so that the three advisors differed in their pattern of agreement
(i.e., bias) despite being equal on average agreement rate and accuracy rate.
Continuous lines represent expected agreement rates, dashed lines represent
empirical data pooled across the two feedback groups.
Following Experiment 2, we expected different patterns of results to
emerge from feedback and feedback-free conditions. Specifically, based on
the Confidence model, we predict that when feedback is not available, trust
reports and influence measure will favor the bias-sharing advisor over the
other advisors. This follows from the fact that both participants and the
Confidence model will experience more high-confidence agreements with the
bias-sharing advisor compared to the non-bias sharing one. This will happen
even if advisors are matched in terms of accuracy and agreement, because
participants and the Confidence model will learn the association between in-
ternal metacognitive states (like confidence) with external contingencies (like
agreements/disagreements). Neither the Consensus or the Accuracy models
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are expected to distinguish among advisors. When objective feedback is
provided, we might expect that participants will not distinguish between
advisors given that they are all equally reliable (∼ 70% accuracy).
The same measures of interest adopted in the first two experiment -
namely the explicit trust measure and the implicit advice influence mea-
sure - were adopted here to compare how different advisors’ profiles were
perceived by the participants. Again, the three model variants were applied
to the new data.
4.1.4 Exclusion criteria
An exclusion criterion based on staircase convergence was set so to exclude all
participants who appeared to have a random guessing strategy. Application
of this criterion resulted in the exclusion of one participant from the Feed-
back group and one participant from the No-Feedback group, leaving a total
of 25 and 23 participants in these groups, respectively. Average difficulty
parameter d was 9.98± 2.82 (pooled data).
4.2 Results
The following analyses were performed to evaluate whether advisor types dif-
fered according to the measures of explicit trust and implicit opinion change.
Furthermore we were interested in knowing whether this effect was modulated
by the presence of feedback. Feedback acted as a between-participants fac-
tor while advisor type acted as a within-participants factor in the following
mixed-design ANOVAs. For within-participants variables, degrees of free-
dom were corrected for violations of sphericity according to the Greenhouse-
Geisser procedure, with epsilon values reported as appropriate.
4.2.1 Trust ratings
A mixed-design ANOVA was run on explicitly rated trust scores from the
end-of-block questionnaires, with Feedback as a between-participants fac-
tor and Advisor Type as within-participants factor. This analysis revealed
no significant main effect of Advisor Type (F (2, 92) = 1.66, p = .19, η2G =
.03,  = 0.99) or Feedback (F < 1), but a significant interaction between
these factors (F (1, 92) = 6.64, p = .002, η2G = .12,  = 0.99). The results
suggest that although different advisors were similarly trusted on average,
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the effect was modulated by the presence of feedback. Figure 5A shows how
the effect of advisor was influenced by the presence of feedback.
39
Figure 5: Experiment 3 - trust ratings and influence of human participants
and simulations. (a) The effect of advisor type on explicitly reported trust,
separately for the Feedback and No-Feedback condition. Error bars represent
s.e.m. (b) The effect of advisor type on the influence measure, divided by the
two feedback conditions. Error bars represent s.e.m. (c) Average θ-values,
representing the model’s trust in different advisors, differ depending on what
pieces of information the model has access to. Error bars represent s.e.m.
Separate within-groups analyses were carried out to understand differ-
40
ences among advisors present in each experimental group. For the group
of participants receiving trial-by-trial feedback, a one-way repeated mea-
sures ANOVA (Figure 5A) revealed a significant effect of Advisor Type
(F (2, 48) = 4.90, p = .01, η2G = .16), with rated trust being highest for
the anti-bias advisor, intermediate for the unbiased advisor, and lowest for
the bias-sharing advisor. Follow-up pairwise comparisons indicated that
the bias-sharing advisor was significantly less trusted than the anti-bias
advisor (t(24) = 3.09, p = .004, d = 1.07, BH[0,1] = 47.34), with no reli-
able differences observed between the anti-bias and the unbiased advisors
(t(24) = 1.60, p = .12, d = 0.51, BH[0,1] = 1.67) or between the unbiased and
the bias-sharing advisors (t(24) = 1.56, p = .13, d = 0.56, BH[0,1] = 1.83).
This pattern, with a high level of trust in the anti-bias advisor and lower
in the bias-sharing advisor was not predicted (a priori, or by the models as
described below), but is in accordance with the pattern of information gain
of each advisor (Table 3), suggesting that participants’ reported trust was
sensitive to the information carried by each advisor, rather than their simple
accuracy. Similar results are reported below for implicit trust, suggesting
this pattern is robust to different trust elicitation methods.
For trust ratings from the No-Feedback group, a repeated measures one-
way ANOVA also revealed a significant difference among Advisors (F (2, 44) =
3.56, p = .03, η2G = .13), but the pattern observed was very different. As pre-
dicted, rated trust was highest for the bias-sharing advisor when feedback was
absent, numerically so compared with the anti-bias advisor (t(22) = 1.48, p =
.07, d = 0.53, one-tail, BH[0,1] = 1.74) and significantly so compared with the
unbiased advisor (t(22) = 2.81, p = .005, d = 0.98, one-tail, BH[0,1] = 22.42).
The anti-bias and the unbiased advisors did not significantly differ from each
other (p > .1, d = 0.41, BH[0,1] = 1.13), but rated trust was, unexpectedly,
numerically higher for the anti-bias observer than the unbiased advisor.
4.2.2 Influence
Similar patterns of trust were apparent as measured implicitly via advisor
influence (confidence change following advice). A mixed-design ANOVA on
measured influence with Feedback as a between-participants factor and Ad-
visor Type as a within-participants factor, revealed no significant main effect
of Feedback (F (1, 46) = 1.36, p = .24, η2G = .01) nor Advisor (F (2, 92) =
1.12, p = .33, η2G = .009,  = 0.77), but a significant interaction between
the two (F (2, 92) = 4.80, p = .01, η2G = .03,  = 0.77), indicating that the
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presence of feedback modulated the influence that different advisors had on
participants’ opinions (Figure 5B).
When looking at influence in the Feedback condition only, a one-way
ANOVA showed a marginally significant effect of Advisor Type (F (2, 48) =
2.88, p = .06, η2G = .05). Planned comparisons (two-tailed t-tests) showed
that the bias-sharing advisor was less influential than both the anti-bias
advisor (t(24) = 1.98, p = .05, d = 0.54, BH[0,5] = 3.71) and the unbiased
advisor (t(24) = 2.26, p = .03, d = 0.44, BH[0,5] = 6.56). The anti-bias ad-
visor was numerically more influential than the anti-bias advisor, but this
difference was not reliable (t(24) = 1.10, p = .28, d = 0.26, BH[0,5] = 1.47).
A one-way ANOVA on influence measured in the No-Feedback condition
revealed a significant effect of Advisor (F (2, 44) = 3.25, p = .04, η2G = .03).
Planned comparisons showed that the bias-sharing advisor was significantly
more influential than the unbiased advisor (t(22) = 2.63, p = .007, d = 0.46,
one-tail, BH[0,5] = 13.62) and numerically more influential than the anti-bias
advisor (t(22) = 1.46, p = .07, d = 0.29, one-tail, BH[0,5] = 2.06). No signif-
icant difference was found between the unbiased and the anti-bias advisors
(p > .1, d = 0.16, BH[0,5] = 1.07), but the direction of the difference was
the same as for explicitly rated trust, with the anti-bias advisor somewhat
more influential on participants’ decisions and confidence than the unbiased
advisor. Thus, these results seem to suggest that the bias-sharing advisor
was more influential than the other two when trial-by-trial feedback was not
available.
In summary, as in Experiment 2, we find that participants’ perception
of advice reliability varies systematically according to whether trial-by-trial
feedback is present or absent when advice is correlated with their own initial
decisions. In particular, trust in advisors follows their relative informative-
ness when feedback is provided, but when feedback is absent participants
tend to trust in and be influenced by advisors who share their judgment
biases (i.e., in advisors who agree with their confidently held judgments).
4.3 Model results
The following simulations and analyses were performed to explore the dif-
fering patterns of trust across advisors that are expected from simple mod-
els of estimating advisor reliability. Differences in θ-values observed among
the three model variants show how same experiences of stimuli and advice
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can give rise to different trust judgments depending on the information an
observer has access to. Simulations are also useful in the context of this
experiment, because they allow us to check that our designs were controlled
as intended (e.g., for agreement rates across advisors) even though we had
less precise control over conditions because counterbalancing depended on an
evolving estimate of participants confidence distributions. Figure 5C shows
the pattern of results that the three model variants produce.
Both when the model has access to trial-by-trial feedback (Accuracy vari-
ant), and when it only has access to past agreement (Consensus variant), no
significant effect of Advisor is observed (F (2, 94) < 1.70, p > .18, η2G < .02),
nor is there a difference between the bias-sharing and the anti-bias advisor.
These patterns are expected because the three advisors were matched for
accuracy and agreement rates by design in this experiment. On the contrary,
a Confidence variant - which uses metacognitive information and past agree-
ment (but lacked access to trial-level feedback) - showed a significant effect
of Advisor (F (2, 94) = 7.95, p < .001, η2G = .10). Specifically, simulated trust
was higher for the bias-sharing advisor than the anti-bias advisor (t(47) =
3.54, p = .001, d = .74, B[0,.05] = 114.64), and higher for the unbiased advisor
than the anti-bias advisor (t(47) = 2.99, p = .004, d = .57, B[0,.05] = 18.16).
Simulated trust was higher for the unbiased than the bias-sharing advisor,
but this difference was not reliable (t(47) = 1.21, p = .22, d = .25, B[0,.05] =
0.41). These findings indicate that by accessing metacognitive signals (as
provided in the model by participants’ confidence ratings) the model was
able to discriminate among different advisors. This model correctly predicts
greatest levels of trust in a bias-sharing advisor, but also predicts lowest
levels of trust in anti-bias advisors, whereas our experimental participants
expressed (numerically) lowest levels of trust in unbiased advisors.
Post-advice confidence correlations. As described above, our main
analyses for each experiment focused on qualitative predictions arising from
different strategies for inferring advisor reliability. Collectively, the results
are consistent with the hypothesis that people use their internal sense of con-
fidence in making these inferences - showing sensitivity to advisor accuracy in
the absence of objective feedback, even when advisors are matched for agree-
ment rate, and developing differing patterns of trust when advisor agreement
rates vary with their own expressed decision confidence. Our final analysis of
the empirical data attempted a more quantitative comparison of model pre-
43
dictions, specifically focusing on the whether the Consensus or Confidence
models better predicted post-advice confidence ratings across trials for the
participants in the No Feedback conditions of Experiments 1-3.
For this analysis we used Bayes rule to infer the trial-by-trial post-advice
confidence ratings that each variant would express given a participant’s ex-
pressed pre-advice confidence and advisor agreement (see SI). The within-
participant correlation between participants’ post-advice confidence and model’s
post-advice confidence was computed for each experiment, for No-Feedback
groups only. Second-order statistics were performed to test, across experi-
ments, which variant was more strongly correlated with the human data. A
2x2 ANOVA on correlation coefficients with Model (Consensus vs. Confi-
dence) and Experiment as factors showed that the Confidence variant was
significantly more correlated with participants’ responses than the Consen-
sus variant (F (1, 22) = 8.18, p = 0.009, η2G = 0.0049). No significant ef-
fect of experiment nor interaction between the two were found (F (2, 44) <
1.3, p > .25), suggesting that, across experiments, the Confidence model’s
post-advice confidence more strongly covaried with participants’ true post-
advice responses. As a check for the soundness of this model comparison
method, the same 2x2 ANOVA was run on the correlation coefficients be-
tween participants’ post-advice confidence and the model’s post-advice con-
fidence predictions, after randomly shuffling trials within each participant.
This operation should ensure that any advantage of the Confidence variant
over the Consensus variant is not due to unspecific factors (like being overall
more conservative in updating confidence), but rather to trial-level variabil-
ity. After reshuffling, the Consensus and Confidence variants were not signif-
icantly different from each other (F (1, 22 = 1.95, p = 0.17, η2G = 9.54e− 04),
corroborating our conclusions.
4.4 Experiment discussion
Experiment 3 showed again that systematic differences in trust emerge as a
function of feedback when advisors’ judgements are non-independent from
the advisee, and further demonstrated a strong influence of our agreement-
in-confidence manipulation on trust. Here, the presence of feedback partly
reversed the pattern of trust ratings and influence measure that was observed
when trial-by-trial feedback was unavailable: When objective feedback was
provided, people trusted more and were more influenced by an advisor who
more frequently agreed with them when they themselves were unsure (vs.
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less frequently when they were sure), and showed less trust in an advisor
who tended to agree with them in decisions in which they were already sure.
On the contrary, when objective trial-by-trial feedback was removed, this
pattern partly reversed such that trust and influence were greatest for the
advisor who tended to agree with participants’ confidently made judgments.
Participants expressed less trust in an advisor who tended to disagree with
their confidently made judgments and even more so in an unbiased advisor
whose tendency to agree or disagree did not vary with the participants initial
decision confidence.
Participants in the Feedback group showed an effect of advisor type even
though the feedback indicated that all advisors were equal in terms of both
agreement rate and accuracy. These findings contrast somewhat with the
results of Experiment 2, where ratings of trust and measures of advice influ-
ence were dominated by agreement rates when these varied markedly across
advisors. Evidently, though agreement appears to be a critical determinant
of trust (with or without feedback), participants remain sensitive to other
dimensions of advice. Here, they appeared sensitive to the informational
value (“information gain”, see SI) of the advice and not only to its reliability
per se: They trusted and were more influenced by advisors whose judgments
were less redundant with their own, in particular showing greatest trust in
the advisor whose advice was most likely to improve their performance (by
reinforcing, through agreement, initial judgments that were correct but most
likely to waver due to low initial confidence).
As predicted, participants in the No Feedback group showed greatest
trust in advisors who tended to agree with their own confidently expressed
judgments. However, more surprisingly, participants did not show least trust
in the anti-bias advisor who agreed with them more frequently when their
initial judgment was made with low confidence. If anything, trust was lower
in the unbiased advisor. The difference was not reliable and hence must
be interpreted with caution, but we note a possible link to an existing pro-
posal about how expertise is assessed in the absence of feedback. Thus,
according to Weiss and Shanteau (2003), scarcely differentiated judgments
across different observations tend to be indicative of lower expertise. In the
present experiment, the unbiased advisor was characterized by this lack of
differentiation, in that her advice agreement rate was constant as a function
of participants’ initial decision confidence, in contrast to the two other advi-
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sors. Nonetheless, regardless of the explanation of this unexpected result, the
findings of Experiment 3 demonstrate participants’ sensitivity to advice in
relation to their own confidence in their judgments, and learn differentiated
patterns of trust accordingly.
5 Agent-based modeling: network-level im-
pacts of individuals’ trust strategies
The experimental and simulation results described above demonstrate that
the absence of trial-level objective feedback does not preclude agents from
inferring the trustworthiness of other agents. Simple heuristics based on
agreement and decision confidence can be good proxies for objective feedback.
However, our findings also highlight that systematic deviations between feed-
back and feedback-free scenarios - and, correspondingly, systematic biases in
trust formation - can be observed when judges’ and advisors’ judgments are
correlated (e.g., due to shared biases or common sources of information).
Thus far we have focused on the situation of an individual decision maker
learning about the quality of advice from different sources. To extend this
work, we explored how these effects might play out in more complex, multi-
actor situations using agent-based modeling.
Using an agreement (or agreement-in-confidence) heuristic can be an ef-
fective strategy to infer partners’ reliability when more objective cues are
not available. However, predictable distortions are expected when indepen-
dence is not preserved among judges. If patterns of trust vary depending
on feedback availability, we might expect different macro-level patterns of
trust in networks where feedback is available rather than difficult to obtain.
Furthermore, the presence of bi-directional information channels between
agents (as opposed to judge-advisor systems) may lead to clustering of peo-
ple who share the same biases, increasing the polarization of their views
(i.e., confidence magnitude) as well as producing phenomena of groupthink
(Janis, 1972; Turner & Pratkanis, 1998). These effects parallel important
observations about human social networks. Informational echo-chambers -
whereby individuals with similar characteristics tend to form clusters that
are impenetrable to external information - have been often described in social
sciences (Jasny et al., 2015; Sunstein, 2001). When exposed to competing
opinions on social media, people belonging to the same cluster may prefer,
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consume and share within-cluster information more than between-cluster in-
formation (Bessi, 2016; Del Vicario et al., 2016), in a similar manner that
people in a group prefer to discuss shared information than private informa-
tion (Schulz-Hardt, Brodbeck, Mojzisch, Kerschreiter, & Frey, 2006; Stasser
& Titus, 2003). If so, the present ideas might provide a normative account
of the origin of these effects that otherwise seem suboptimal: According to
our findings, preference for agreeing opinions (particularly those that agree
with our confidently held views) is an adaptive strategy for estimating ad-
vice reliability in the absence of an objective standard, but can lead to these
systematic biases in trust when opinions and judgments are non-independent.
To explore this hypothesis, we used agent-based modeling to explore how
the manipulation of feedback availability affects network structure and in-
formation flow. Agent-based models are useful tools to study phenomena
of emergence from simple interacting parts. Manipulating agents’ access to
metacognitive signals can thus shed light on how the cognitive structure of
agents can affect the structure of a network (Epstein, 2013). Giving agents
choice over what information to sample - for example, if reliability estimates
were used to guide advisor choice (Aiello et al., 2012; Denrell, 2005) - might
further remove agents from being exposed to useful but uncorrelated infor-
mation (cf. our “anti-bias” advisor in Experiment 3).
In the following section, we test how macro-scale patterns of trust and be-
liefs are affected by the presence or absence of feedback in networks of agents
employing the cognitive strategies described so far in this work. We expect
that (a) When judgments in the population are independent, agreement-
based heuristics are useful in reliably approximating true underlying exper-
tise; (b) when judgments are correlated - e.g., due to the presence of shared
biases in the population - agents sharing similar biases will tend to segregate
due to the use of a confidence-agreement heuristic in feedback-free (but not
feedback-rich) scenarios; (c) The use of trust to discount advice will be ben-
eficial to agents’ accuracy when judgments are independent but not when
they are correlated.
5.1 Model description
An agent-based model was programmed using NetLogo (Wilensky, 1999)
and is available upon request at https://github.com/chri4354/trust\
formation\ without\ feedback. It simulates development of trust among
agents as they make decisions, and revise these decisions on the basis of
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learning about the opinions of others, in a series of simple binary choices: Is
a stimulus from category A or B, as a generalised case of the specific dot dis-
crimination task used in our experiments. Of interest was how trust among
agents was affected by the relative quality of their decisions, the availability
of feedback and, crucially, the degree to which agents shared biases in their
decision processes. Our models formalised these biases as differences in prior
(base rate) expectations about the likelihood of A or B being the correct
answer, which via Bayesian belief updating will bias the interpretation of
incoming information in the decision process (as an analogue of what might
be expected to happen in everyday decisions as a function of our political
leanings, musical preferences, tastes in wine, etc.).
The model was initialised as a fully connected directed network of N
agents. A directed edge from agent i to agent j represents the trust θi,j that
i has in j’s opinions. We simulate agents on a lattice network performing
repeated binary A/B decisions, receiving advice from other agents, inferring
their reliability and updating their own initial decisions. We let the simu-
lation run for a 1000 steps. A signal s with strength S was drawn from a




. This represents the decision quan-
tity to estimate (e.g., difference in dots or true state of the world). The task
of each agent was to determine if s was positive (event A) or negative (event
B). Each agent estimated the posterior probability of A given the perceptual
information generated by s as follows:
p′(A) = p(A|Ep) = p(A)Ep
p(A)Ep + p(A¯)E¯p
(1)
Ep = L(s+N (0, σ)) (2)
where p(A) is the prior probability of observing As before seeing any stim-
ulus, L is a logistic sigmoid mapping from sensory evidence to probability; Ep
is the perceptual evidence resulting from such mapping andN is independent
individual perceptual Gaussian noise with mean 0 and standard deviation σ.
Each agent’s perceptual noise (and thus accuracy) was manipulated by vary-
ing the noise parameter σ. Each agent’s bias was manipulated by varying
the value p(A). Agents’ confidence was represented as the distance from the
uncertainty point .5:
C = .50 + |p′(A)− .50| (3)
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Trust, represented by the network’s edges, was initialized to 0.50 for every
agent and updated after social interaction. After making a judgment, agents
selected one other agent to interact with either at random (i.e., without
biased sampling) or proportionally to their trust (with biased sampling).
Agents then updated their initial judgment p′(A) as follows:




where Es represents social evidence and is obtained from the advisor’s
judgment either by taking the advisor’s raw judgment p′(A) (without advice
discounting) or by discounting the advisor’s judgment proportionally to the
agent’s trust in the advisor (with advice discounting). Advice discounting
consisted in a linear regression toward the uncertainty point .5. (equation
S20). After updating their judgments, each agent i updated its trust judg-
ments (i.e., outward edges) based on the available information about other
agents. If feedback is available, the agent updates its current trust in agent
j by virtue of a delta rule in the form:
θt+1i,j = θ
t
i,j + α(Fj − θti,j) (5)
where Fj is the accuracy of agent j and α is a learning rate set to 0.1.
If feedback is not available on the contrary, the agent replaces F with Fˆ ,
or the estimated partner’s accuracy. Fˆ was calculated using the agreement
or agreement in confidence heuristics described above. In our simulations,
we assessed the effect of feedback availability as it varied parametrically,
from being available after every decision (i.e., p-feedback = 1.0), available
after only some decisions (i.e., 0 ¡ p-feedback ¡ 1), or never available (i.e.,
p-feedback = 0), rather than the simpler case of feedback presence/absence
that we studied experimentally above.
The emergence of trust patterns when using agreement-based heuristics
can be expected to track true accuracy when judgments are independent
but generate clustering of populations when judgment correlations emerge
within such populations. We defined a network’s clustering coefficient as the
ratio between average trust toward agents who initially share the same bias
(in-group trust) and total average trust: θ¯in−group/(θ¯in−group + θ¯out−group). A
ratio of 0.5 represents no preference (i.e., no difference in trust) toward agents
sharing the same bias, while a ratio greater than 0.5 represents a preference
toward agents sharing the same initial biases. We test how network clustering
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is shaped by the presence or absence of objective feedback and show that
bias-specific segregation arises only in the absence of feedback.
Finally, once bias-specific segregation is established, we ask whether such
clustering remains stable. In particular, after 500 iterations we allow agents
to dynamically change their original bias as a function of experience. For
example, it is known that the bias observed in people performing binary
judgments is influenced by their recent history of decisions (Akaishi, Umeda,
Nagase, & Sakai, 2014; Zylberberg, Wolpert, & Shadlen, 2018). In the present
context, if an agent systematically reports “A” but receives negative feed-
back, they should reduce their bias by decreasing their prior probability p(a).
Similarly, when feedback is absent, an agent who systematically reports “A”
but finds themselves, after interacting with other agents, believing that Bs
are more frequent than expected, should reduce their bias towards As. Con-
versely, bias should get stronger if the social contexts reinforces it (although
see (Bail et al., 2018)). We modelled bias update with a delta rule:
p(A)t+1 = p(A)t + α(I t − p(A)t) (6)
where I t is an indicator variable that represents the final belief in the
event A. When objective feedback is available, I takes the value of 1 if an
event A occurred and 0 otherwise. When feedback is not available, I is set
to the discrete or continuous final subjective belief in the event A. In the
following section, we show the results obtained when a discrete final belief is
used in the absence of feedback:
I =
{
1, if pˆ(A) ≥ 0.5
0, otherwise
Similar results were obtained setting I to the continuous belief pˆ(A).
5.2 Results
We first tested the hypothesis that agreement-based heuristics are adaptive
in situations of independent judgments because they reliably track others’ ex-
pertise without the need to rely on external forms of feedback. To this end,
we set all agents’ initial bias p(A) to 0.50 and the probability of feedback to
0. We then created two sub-populations of agents that orthogonally varied in
their overall judgment accuracy (modeled as the degree of perceptual noise,
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with decreasing accuracy as a function of increasing noise). We then calcu-
lated the average trust toward a target sub-population (here, Population 2).
The results show that average trust in Population 2 agents correctly tracks
their underlying perceptual noise: Trust in Population 2 is highest when
their judgments are more accurate (i.e., when their perceptual noise is low:
upper pixels in Figure 7A) and decreases as their perceptual noise increases.
Interestingly, the effect is not linear and we observe an interaction between
the accuracy of Population 1 and the accuracy of Population 2 (Figures 6
upper panel, S3), mirroring the simple numerical analysis shown in Figure
1B: In the absence of feedback, poor performers in Population 1 fail to dis-
tinguish the accuracy of others, evident as a narrower range of trust values in
rightward pixels in Figure 7A [cf. (Kruger & Dunning, 1999)]. Nevertheless,
overall, we see that trust in Population 2 systematically tracks its level of
performance, even when agents lack any objective standard against which to
judge their own decisions or those of others.
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Figure 6: A: average trust shown in agents belonging to population 2. Trust
in these agents increases as the noise affecting them decreases. Interestingly,
trust formation is affected by perceptual noise of the observed agent(s) as
well as perceptual noise of the observing agent(s) [cf.(Kruger & Dunning,
1999)]. B: benefit of advice for Population 1. Pixels’ color represent the
difference between post and pre-advice accuracy. C: the use of a trust-based
advice discounting strategy increases post-interaction accuracy of accurate
agents’ but not inaccurate ones.
Our second hypothesis was that when the true state of the world is dif-
ficult to discern (e.g., when objective feedback is absent, signal strength is
weak or perceptual noise is large), bias-specific segregation can arise. As
described above, we quantify this segregation in terms of a clustering metric,
which indicates the degree to which trust in in-group members exceeds trust
in out-group members (indicated by clustering > 0.5).
In this simulation, we varied the bias p(A) shown by two subpopulations of
equal size and equal average accuracy (equivalent average perceptual noise).
For each individual, we randomly draw p(A) from a uniform distribution in
the range [0, 0.50] (Population 1) and [0.50, 1] (Population 2): That is, the
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two populations differ in their base rate estimates of the relative likelihood
of the two outcomes (A and B), with Population 1 biased towards judging
events as “A”s and Population 2 biased towards judging events as “B”s. On
each iteration, agents interacted with another randomly selected agent and
updated their trust according to equation 5. Figure 7 shows the average clus-
tering shown after 1000 iterations as a function of signal strength (from low
in the upper panels to high in the lower panels), perceptual noise (variation
along the x-axis of each panel), feedback probability (y-axis), and whether
agents update their bias depending on recent experience (left column: with-
out bias update; vs. right column: with bias update).
Average clustering decreased as the probability of receiving objective feed-
back increased, evident in Figure 7 as darker pixels in the lower parts of each
panel. When objective feedback is consistently presented, trust is deter-
mined by an advisor’s objective accuracy rather than their agreement with
the agents’ own judgments on each trial. Trust therefore converges to the
same value for all agents, regardless of group, reflecting the fact that un-
derlying accuracy (dependent on the level of perceptual noise) was equal on
average across the entire population. A similar principle explains why clus-
tering also decreased as signal strength increased - evident in Figure 7 as
darker pixels on average in the lower panels of the figure than in the up-
per panels: When signal strength is high, agents’ decisions are dominated
by external evidence rather than their prior expectations (as per Equation
1 above), thus agreement levels are high with both in-group and out-group
members, and agents learn similar levels of trust in others across the whole
population. On the other hand, clustering tends to decrease as perceptual
noise increases (i.e., as agents’ average accuracy decreases), evident in Fig-
ure 7 as darker pixels to the right-hand side of each panel. This observation
reflects the fact that as agents’ accuracy tends towards chance levels, their
likelihood of agreement with others will correspondingly tend towards chance
(regardless of others’ accuracy) (Figure S6), and they therefore lose the abil-
ity to distinguish advisor accuracy in the absence of an objective standard
(cf. Figure 1B), and learn low levels of trust in both in-group and out-group
members (Figure S5).
On the contrary, agents in each sub-population tended to trust in-group
members more than outgroup members as a function of decreasing feedback
availability and signal strength, with this dependence disrupted under con-
ditions of increasing perceptual noise. When signal strength is low, agents
decisions are more strongly influenced by their prior expectations (as they
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should be, according to Bayes theorem). As a consequence, when feedback is
infrequent or absent, agents trust is dominated by agreement over objective
accuracy, and clustering with like-minded (bias-sharing) in-group members
results, a function of increased agreement rates among members of homo-
geneous populations. This finding suggests that a simple delta rule of trust
update can perform very differently depending on what source of information
is used to supervise learning. The circular nature of using one’s own belief
to estimate others’ accuracy produces higher clustering and segregation in
scenarios where feedback is infrequent or absent, and decisions are often am-
biguous. Meanwhile, our results are also in accordance with recent studies
in ecology and network science, which suggest that the presence of noise is
beneficial to group decision making to the extent that it reduces the risk of
getting stuck on local optima (Couzin et al., 2011; Kao & Couzin, 2014; Shi-
rado & Christakis, 2017): Here, high levels of noise disrupt the formation of
clustering according to pre-existing biases (albeit by reducing trust in both
in-group and out-group members alike) (Figure S5).
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Figure 7: Clustering as a function of signal strength, probability of feed-
back and noise. Each pixel in each panel indicates the average clustering
value (over 20 simulations), computed as described in the main text, after
1000 iterations of decision, advice and update in a network of agents with
fixed stimulus strength, perceptual noise and feedback probability parame-
ters. Right and left columns distinguish simulations with and without bias
update respectively. Rows from top to bottom represent increasing signal
strengths.
Our third and final hypothesis was that segregation between in-group and
out-group members, once established, can resist modification and in turn af-
fect the persistence of shared beliefs. In this simulation, agents first made
decisions with fixed biases (i.e., a fixed p(A) value) and learnt trust in other
agents across multiple iterations, as in the previous simulation. As before,
the two populations drew their initial biases from random distributions fa-
voring either A or B as a prior (p(A) > .5 or p(A) < .5, respectively), with
feedback availability and perceptual noise level fixed in each simulation run
but varied across runs to explore the impact of these parameters on network
behavior. Signal strength was fixed at 1, where a wider range of behaviors
was previously observed (Figure 7). However, crucially in this simulation,
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after 500 iterations we allowed agents to update their bias, whereby their
experience of the relative prevalence of A and B outcomes (as determined by
their belief-influenced interpretation of sensory evidence, opinions of part-
ners, and objective feedback where available) leads to modification of their
estimates of p(A). Of interest was the way in which the biases of the two
groups evolved across interactions as a function of feedback availability, per-
ceptual noise, and information sampling strategy.
The results are shown in Figure 8, which plots the results of separate
simulations for populations of agents that select partners either at random
(columns A and B) or according to their current levels of trust in other agents
(columns C and D). Columns A and C plot bias (i.e., mean p(A) value) across
1000 iterations of the decision task for the two groups in the population - one
initially biased toward A decisions (red lines) and the other initially biased
toward B decisions (green lines). Columns B and D plot the distribution of
biases across members of each group after the final (1000th) iteration.
As shown in Figure 8, when feedback is always available (saturated red
and green lines), decision biases rapidly diminish such that agents from both
populations converge on accurate estimates of the relative likelihood of A
vs. B outcomes (i.e., unbiased estimates that vary narrowly around p(A)
= 0.5). This convergence occurs irrespective of the level of perceptual noise
and the way agents select their partners, reflecting the obvious value of hav-
ing an objective standard against which to evaluate decisions. However, as
feedback becomes less and less available (indicated in Figure 8 as reducing
saturation of line colors), population biases are more persistent in a manner
that exhibits sensitivity to both information selection strategy and levels of
perceptual noise. Consider first the simulations of populations with random
sampling of partners (columns A and B). When agents randomly sample their
advisors, they tend to converge on accurate estimates of p(A) (i.e., ∼= 0.5).
This occurs even when feedback is not available (as indicated by low satura-
tion lines) and independently of noise level (as indicated by different rows).
The reason is that when agents sample their advisors at random, agents are
equally likely to receive advice that the correct answer is A vs. B (or in
other words advice that is characterized by their same bias vs. opposite
bias). However, when agents weight advice in proportion to trust, they are
more strongly influenced by other agents who share their initial bias (and
therefore in whom they learn more trust based on patterns of agreement, as
explored in the previous simulation) (Figure S4). Thus, social information
can stabilise initial group biases insofar that agents rely on this social infor-
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mation as feedback probability decreases (populations with lighter colored
lines exhibit systematically larger biases in Figure 8 and S4). The lower pan-
els of Figure S4 A-B show that these population biases are disrupted when
agents have higher levels of perceptual noise: This effect is partly due to
noise reducing the influence of prior expectations on individual agents own
decisions, but is also due to noise disrupting trust in other agents who share
an initial bias (because noise will tend to reduce agreement rates with these
individuals (Figures S5 and S6)).
As shown in the right hand panels of Figure 8, the stabilising effect of so-
cial information also shows up when agents select partners to receive advice
from as a function of their trust in those agents (columns C and D). Un-
der these circumstances, stable group biases can persist even when feedback
probability is as high as 0.8 (in the simulation when noise is absent, Figure
8C, top panel), even if those biases are relatively small. This stabilisation is
a natural consequence of preferentially seeking advice from agents who share
a bias toward believing p(A) is systematically greater than (red group) or
lower than (green group) its true value. Perhaps even more strikingly, the
simulations also reveal cases where social information leads to extreme bi-
ases when objective feedback is rarely available: In these cases (light colored
lines, e.g., p(feedback) < .4 in the top panel of Figure 8C), group biases
actually become more extreme over time. This phenomenon emerges from
a positive feedback loop whereby agents who share an initial bias (of, say,
believing that p(A) > 0.5) will tend to ask each other for advice more often,
thereby compounding each others biased beliefs, and thereby increasing their
tendency to seek advice from like-minded agents, thereby compounding their
bias, and so on across iterations. The two groups therefore diverge to sep-
arate stable networks that exhibit extreme biases (of p(A) ∼= 0 and p(A)
∼= 1) and a strong tendency only to trust and seek advice from in-group
members. In this way, sub-optimal behaviors at the network-level - such as
self-sustaining biases and even extremes of polarization - can emerge from
decision and learning strategies that are normatively sensible at the level
of individual agents: Using decision confidence as a proxy for objective ac-
curacy can allow agents to learn about the reliability of social information
sources when feedback is infrequent or even absent. Moreover, using social
information can in turn allow agents to learn about the world under these
conditions of diminished feedback. However, these learning strategies exhibit
important limitations when agents initial decisions are not independent but
rather exhibit patterns of shared vs. distinct biases across individuals within
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a population.
Figure 8: Bias as a function of time, feedback probability and agents’ per-
ceptual noise. Rows represent increasing levels of noise. Lines alpha values
represent probability of objective feedback. Columns A and B show agents’
bias evolution over time and final bias distribution when agents choose their
partners at random. Columns C and D show the same graphs when agents
choose their partner proportionally to their trust. Color saturation repre-
sents feedback probability and color represents the two original bias subpop-
ulations.
Overall, the results of the agent-based modelling show the macro-scale ef-
fects of feedback availability, use of different reliability estimation strategies
(feedback vs. agreement-based), and partner-selection strategies. Contrary
to judge-advisor systems - where information flows from the advisor to the
judge - here we allow agents to share information bidirectionally and use this
information to estimate each other’s reliability. Once again, agreement-based
strategies provide an effective way to learn the reliability of social partners
when feedback is not available and judgments are independent. However,
they lead to predictable patterns of clustering and trust when agents’ agree-
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ment rates are inflated by their shared biases or access to correlated informa-
tion. Moreover, bias updating and partner-selection strategies also affect the
structure of the network by changing the segregation of individuals sharing
the same bias, leading to stabilisation of networks with systematically biased
or even extremely polarized beliefs about the world (in our simulations, the
relative likelihood of A vs. B being the correct decision).
6 General Discussion
The present research explored how people learn the reliability of social infor-
mation sources in contexts where objective external feedback is not readily
available. In these scenarios, we hypothesize that metacognitive confidence
provides a useful proxy for objective feedback. This is due to the fact that in
many tasks, confidence provides a finely calibrated estimate of underlying ac-
curacy (Fleming, 2016; Henmon, 1911; Koriat, 2012a; Pescetelli et al., 2016)
as it represents the subjectively estimated likelihood of a correct decision
being made (Aitchison et al., 2015; Fleming & Daw, 2017). Thus, people can
apply this internal confidence estimate to received advice in order to estimate
its reliability (as p(correct) in the case of agreement, and 1-p(correct) in the
case of disagreement). Experiment 1 empirical data and simulations show the
power of this agreement-in-confidence heuristic in identifying subtle differ-
ences in advice quality when advice provides new independent information:
Participants (and simple models) learned to distinguish advisors of differing
accuracy and confidence calibration even in the absence of objective feed-
back, and did so to a similar extent to participants (and simple models) who
had access to objective feedback after every decision. Thus, we propose that
people are able to follow internal signals (e.g., decision confidence) in a com-
parable manner to external signals - such as rewards or feedback - to learn
about the reliability of advice and advisors according to associative learning
principles (Behrens et al., 2008; Sutton & Barto, 1998).
These findings extend our understanding of the uses of metacognitive
signals. The simulation results show that a model endowed with access to
its own metacognitive signals can discriminate between advisors better than
models that only have access to objective feedback or agreement rate. Thus,
metacognitive signals like confidence judgments are useful not only for inter-
nal uncertainty monitoring (Yeung & Summerfield, 2012), information seek-
ing (Desender, Boldt, & Yeung, 2018), cognitive control (Botvinick et al.,
59
2001) and social coordination (Bahrami et al., 2010; Shea et al., 2014), but
are also useful in evaluating the reliability of external information sources.
The present findings demonstrate the potential bi-directionality of this in-
ference process: Confidence is not only the end-product of information flow
from the external stimulus to a perceptual inference, but it can feed back
to help making inferences about external events. Confidence represents a
probabilistic estimation that once formed can be used to infer the state of
variables that did not directly generate it. Evidence seems to support this
notion, as confidence signals have been shown to parallel reward prediction
error signals in feedback-free situations (Guggenmos et al., 2016; Zylberberg
et al., 2018).
Our findings also extend previous work on the role of confidence in group
decision making (Bahrami et al., 2010; Koriat, 2012b; Sorkin et al., 2001).
Previous studies have documented the way that the confidence accompanying
advice provides a useful and impactful signal of its reliability (Bahrami et al.,
2010; Swol & Sniezek, 2005). Here, we explore the converse situation of how
an advisee’s internal sense of confidence can modulate perceptions of advice.
Thus, whereas previous studies have shown how confidence judgments from
two individuals can be used to combine optimally the individual estimates
of external stimulus attributes, our experiments and simulations wants to
show that an observer’s internal confidence about the state of the external
stimulus can also be used to estimate the reliability of a social partner over
and beyond what can be inferred from objective external cues. We used a
traditional Judge-Advisor System paradigm (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Sniezek
& Buckley, 1989; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000) but incorporated a perceptual
decision making paradigm to allow precise control over important variables
such as strength of evidence available for the initial decision, the information
carried by advice, and the manipulation of objective feedback to enable social
decision making to be understood in terms of current theories of confidence
as a probabilistic computation (Pouget et al., 2016).
Experiments 2 and 3 explored crucial limitations of the agreement-in-
confidence heuristic, which leads to systematic biases in trust and influence
when advice is not independent of an individual’s own opinions. Much of the
work in psychology in the last decades has focused on heuristics and biases
affecting human judgments (Gigerenzer, 2008; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
Given our limited cognitive capacities, we must often adapt to use approxima-
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tions or “short-cuts” to find good-enough solutions to otherwise intractable
problems. Heuristics are computationally cheap solutions that work well in
environments characterized by the statistical properties of the environments
they evolved in (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). However, they can lead to
systematic errors when these assumptions are violated. In the current work,
the agreement-in-confidence heuristic provides a solution to the intractable
problem of estimating the reliability of information in the absence of an ob-
jective standard. This solution works well when agreement correlates with
accuracy, as is the case where initial judgment and advice are independent
(Experiment 1). Thus, in Experiment 1, trust and influence patterns were
little affected by the presence or absence of an objective standard. However,
the process goes astray when the independence between judgment and ad-
vice is broken, as in Experiments 2 and 3 where advice was contingent on
participants’ initial decision and expressed confidence. Adverse consequences
emerged in terms of distinct patterns of trust and influence with and without
an objective standard. The result is explained by the fact that when feed-
back is removed participants are only left with their own initial probabilistic
estimate. Any attempt to use this estimate to attribute feedback to their
advisors is cursed by the error characterizing their own original judgment.
As an example, imagine you are certain that you are drinking a very expen-
sive wine at a blind wine tasting event. You will likely judge anybody who
says otherwise as incompetent in wine matters. In the (not so unlikely) event
that you are mistaken, you could keep thinking that a potentially brilliant
sommelier is only a novice, with potentially negative consequences for you in
terms of reputation and future wine choices.
Our results were generally in line with the idea that we trust advisors
according to their objective accuracy when feedback is present and agreeing-
in-confidence advisors when it is absent. However, there were some notable
(and surprising) exceptions. First, advisor agreement rate had an effect over
and above accuracy even when feedback was available in Experiment 2. This
finding suggests that multiple strategies might idiosyncratically converge to
an estimate of advice reliability, with people relying on sometimes-useful
cues (like agreement) even if they are strictly redundant in the current con-
text. Second, people seem to value information over pure accuracy, as shown
by participants in the Feedback group of Experiment 3, who preferred an
advisor who agreed with them more frequently when they themselves were
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correct but low in confidence (the anti-bias advisor) over equally accurate
but less informative advisors. This result is in agreement with literature on
judge-advisor systems showing people’s preference for advisors with unshared
information (Van Swol & Ludutsky, 2007). Finally, a result with a less clear
explanation is that participants in Experiment 3 did not prefer the neutral
to anti-bias advisor when feedback was absent. If anything, they tended to
prefer the latter. We speculate that this unexpected result can be explained
in light of the fact that, in domains where feedback is removed, expertise can
still be estimated by comparing the classification variability observed for sim-
ilar stimuli with the classification variability observed across different stimuli
(Weiss & Shanteau, 2003). One possibility is that participants noticed the
lack of variability in agreement rates (across different trial difficulties as ex-
perienced subjectively and expressed in terms of decision confidence) of the
neutral advisor and consequently discounted this advisor.
When scaling up these cognitive mechanisms to larger population interac-
tions as simulated in agent-based models, we observed that when feedback
was not available and agents’ judgments were independent, agreement-based
trust formation strategies helped agents trust more accurate advisors. How-
ever, when individuals covaried in their signals (e.g., by sharing systematic
biases), we observed the emergence of segregation of individuals according
to their initial biases. Agents within a homogeneous population were more
likely to trust and influence each other than agents belonging to different
populations. The polarization of each cluster’s average bias was reduced by
the presence of random noise, increased signal strength or the presence of ob-
jective feedback. The results provide a potential new understanding of echo-
chamber phenomena, already described in the literature (Sunstein, 2001), as
a by-product of an otherwise adaptive mechanism - use of an agreement-
in-confidence heuristic to estimate advice reliability - when it is difficult to
objectively assess the reliability of others’ opinions, and when these opinions
might themselves be subject to systematic shared biases. In these scenar-
ios, random fluctuations in initial bias for one or the other option within a
population of equally accurate individuals can spiral out to form densely con-
nected communities, thus effectively modifying the network structure. The
results show how simulated agents endowed with realistic cognitive mecha-
nisms can shed light on the emergence of complex patterns at the population
level (Epstein, 2013). More broadly, the present research suggests the value
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of identifying strategies used by individual decision makers - who are likely
to rely on imperfect heuristics given necessary limits in the information they
access and cognitive resources available to process that information - and ex-
ploring how these strategies can influence behavior at the group and network
level. Future research might usefully explore this approach further, and also
the converse case of understanding how group and network dynamics might
inform or constrain the decision strategies used by individuals.
7 Conclusions
The current work aimed to show that confidence is a valuable attribute of
someone’s judgment in social decision-making. It helps others discriminate
when one is more likely to be correct (and thus value their contribution) but
also helps a decision-maker to make consistent judgments about others irre-
spective of feedback availability. However, this potentially adaptive solution
to an intractable problem of learning in the absence of feedback can back-
fire when judgments from different observers are not independent, leading to
systematic biases in trust and influence that may be evident in the behavior
of individuals and in the social networks they inhabit.
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1 Advice Value as Information Gain
1.1 Experiment 1
We formalised an advisor’s informational value as the mean absolute infor-
mation gained after each possible social encounter with a specific advisor.
Information gain is the difference between the posterior and prior probabil-
ity of participant’s correct response:
IG = p(d = w|e)− p(d = w) (1)
where posterior probability correct p(d = w|e) represents the probability
that the decision d is equal to the correct decision w, conditional on the spe-
cific social encounter e. Social encounter e represents one of the four possible
events: the advisor (1) confidently disagrees, (2) unconfidently disagrees, (3)
unconfidently agrees, (4) confidently agrees (where “confidently” and “un-
confidently” refer to the level of confidence expressed by the advisor on that
trial). Posterior probability p(d = w|e) was computed with Bayes’ theorem
and was proportional to participant’s prior probability correct p(d = w) and
the likelihood of the social event given participant’s accuracy p(e|d = w).
Given the staircase procedure, we used 70% as prior p(d = w). The prob-
ability of agreement (or disagreement) conditional on correct response and




















The mean absolute information gain so computed (reported in the main text,
Table 1) was lowest for the Inaccurate Uncalibrated advisor (0.08), intermedi-
ate for the Accurate Calibrated and Accurate Uncalibrated advisors (0.29 and
0.26 respectively) and the highest for the Calibrated but Inaccurate advisor
(0.38). This can be intuitively understood by looking at Table 1, in the main
text. Although the Inaccurate Calibrated advisor’s accuracy rate is lower
than the Accurate Calibrated advisor, outcomes can be better predicted by
its judgment. In particular, its judgments correlate strongly positively when
sure and strongly negatively when unsure with the correct answer. On the
contrary when the Accurate Calibrated advisor is unsure there is a much
higher uncertainty about the final outcome. We also computed an expected
information gain IGe for each advisor (Table 1 in the main text) by scaling
IG by the overall probability of each event:
IGe = IG ∗ p(e) (2)
where p(e) is the overall probability of each social event (i.e., confident
disagreement, unconfident disagreement, unconfident agreement, confident
agreement). The expected information gain captures the idea that extremely
informative but very unlikely events are not very valuable. IGe values for
each advisor were: Accurate Calibrated = .063, Accurate Uncalibrated =
.063, Inaccurate Calibrated = .084, Inaccurate Uncalibrated = .021; suggest-
ing that the Inaccurate Calibrated advisor’s advice was the most informative.
1.2 Experiment 2
Similar to Experiment 1, we used conditional probabilities and the partici-
pants’ expected accuracy to compute the informational value of each advisor.
Advisors’ mean absolute information gain IG and expected information gain
IGe were computed as in the previous experiment. Contrary to Experiment
1, however, advisors did not express different levels of confidence. This cre-
ated only two possible social situations e on each trial (instead of four as in
the previous experiment), namely either agreement or disagreement. As can
be seen in Table 2 in the main text, information gain was highest for the
accurate advisors and the lowest for the agreeing but inaccurate advisor.
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1.3 Experiment 3
The intuition that the anti-bias advisor was the most informative of the
three advisors designed for Experiment 3 was confirmed using a numerical
simulation based on an ideal Bayesian observer performing the task, with a
Gaussian distribution of confidence centred on 25 and with a standard de-
viation of 10. For each initial confidence judgment the information gained
from observing agreement or disagreement was computed for each advisor as
the difference between posterior confidence and prior confidence. Contrary
to previous Experiments, prior probability correct was here defined on a trial
level based on pre-advice confidence. An expected information gain was com-
puted by multiplying the information gain so obtained by the normalisation
term in the Bayes formula. This produced a curve of expected information
gains after agreeing or disagreeing with each advisor over possible pre-advice
confidence levels (Figure 1). The average area under the expected informa-
tion gain curve was taken as an objective measure of advisor informativeness.
Average areas under the curve were 14.74 for the unbiased advisor, 14.63 for
the bias-sharing advisor and 15.78 for the anti-bias advisor. This proce-
dure thus quantified and confirmed the intuition that the anti-bias advisor
provided the most informative advice.
Figure 1: Information gained after agreeing and disagreeing with each advisor
type (color code) for each initial subjective prior confidence. Information gain
is scaled by the likelihood of agreement and disagreement events. Advice
informativeness can be quantified by the area under the curve.
3
2 Measures of interest
Two measures of estimated advice reliability were defined. The first was the
explicit trust that participants expressed in the advisors as collected by the
brief questionnaires presented to participants every two blocks. In Experi-
ment 1, four questions asked participants to directly rate on a scale from 1
(“Not at all”) to 50 (“Extremely”) how much they thought each advisor was
accurate (Q1), confident (Q2a), trustworthy (Q3) and influential on their
own choices (Q4). In Experiment 2, due to the absence of a confidence judg-
ment from advisors, question 2 was replaced with a question asking about
how much participants liked each advisor (Q2b: likeability question). For
all Experiments, the first questionnaire was presented immediately after the
practice blocks but before any interaction with the advisors took place so to
provide a baseline measure. Baseline ratings were subtracted from following
ratings to account for confounding factors related to advisors’ appearance and
inter-individual differences in the use of the scale. A principal component
analysis (PCA) was performed for dimensionality reduction on normalised
difference scores and the first component was taken as a unitary measure of
expressed trust.
In Experiment 1, question loadings for the Feedback condition were 0.52
(Q1), 0.44 (Q2a), 0.50 (Q3), 0.52 (Q4); and for the No-Feedback condition
were 0.51 (Q1), 0.39 (Q2), 0.54 (Q3), 0.52 (Q4).
In Experiment 2, question loadings for the Feedback condition were 0.53
(Q1), 0.39 (Q2b), 0.53 (Q3), 0.52 (Q4); and for the No-Feedback condition
were 0.51 (Q1), 0.41 (Q2), 0.53 (Q3), 0.51 (Q4).
In Experiment 3, question loadings for the Feedback condition were 0.53
(Q1), 0.42 (Q2b), 0.53 (Q3), 0.50 (Q4); and for the No-Feedback condition
were 0.48 (Q1), 0.47 (Q2), 0.53 (Q3), 0.50 (Q4).
The second measure of interest was an implicit index of advisor’s influence
on participant’s opinions, quantifying participant’s confidence change from
pre- to post-advice:
δC = Cpost − Cpre. (3)
where Cpre is, for Experiment 1 and 2, an integer value between +1 and +5
and Cpost is an integer value between -5 and +5 (negative Cpost representing
changes of mind). Positive δC values mean increases in confidence from pre-
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to post-advice and negative values represent decreases in confidence. Notice
that δC values have a negative skew, ranging from -10 (moving from highest
confidence in one judgment to highest confidence in the opposite judgment)
to +4 (moving from lowest to highest confidence rating for a single judg-
ment). In Experiment 3, given the difference scale used, Cpost can assume
values between -50 and 50, while δC can range from -100 to 49. Agree-
ment and disagreement trials have typically opposite effects on confidence
change: agreement usually leads to increases in confidence while disagree-
ment to confidence decreases. The absolute magnitude of confidence shifts
in both agreement and disagreement trials can be expected to grow larger
as the participant makes more use of the advice received. Thus a unitary
measure of influence was obtained by subtracting average δC in disagreement
from average δC in agreement:
I = δ¯aC − δ¯dC (4)
where I assumes greater values as participant’s confidence increases in
agreement and confidence decreases in disagreement become larger.
3 Model Description
Experiment 1 showed that people are sensitive to similar dimensions in the
advice they receive both when objective feedback is available and when it was
not provided. It is unclear what cues people are following to estimate their
partners’ reliability when feedback is taken away. Two simple explanations
can be offered. The first one is that different advisors agreed differently often
with participants and this in turn was taken as an indicator of good perfor-
mance. In a binary choice task, if we assume that two people’s judgments
are independent, agreement rate between the two will scale linearly with the
accuracy of each individual as long as performance is above chance. Given
that participants knew their performance was greater than 50% because they
received a summary feedback at the end of each block, they might have used
raw agreement with their partner as an indicator of the partner’s good per-
formance. Thus accumulating the number of agreement events over time for
each individual advisor separately allows a subject to form a stable opinion
about the other person’s underlying accuracy.
An alternative strategy participants could have used is to accumulate over
time the estimated probability of the advice being correct on a given trial.
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This quantity could be generated based on the internal metacognitive signals
of confidence, which is a noisy representation of the uncertainty associated
with a given perceptual judgment. In other words, given that confidence
in a decision is a probabilistic representation of the correctness of one’s own
decision, it can also be used to estimate the likelihood that the advice received
is correct or incorrect. Accumulating such evidence over time can help a
decision maker to estimate the reliability underlying advice whenever more
secure signals are not available.
To formalise such hypotheses we implemented a simple model that uses
different pieces of information depending on different experimental conditions
to estimate advisors’ reliability. This simple model can then be compared
with human observers to provide insight into the strategies they are using to
evaluate advice reliability.
Three different model variants are described below that account for the
Feedback condition, the No-Feedback condition without metacognitive in-
sight and the No-Feedback condition with metacognitive insight respectively.
3.1 Accuracy Model
When objective feedback is given to participants by the experimenter, the
model can use it to infer the accuracy rate of its advisors. The accuracy
of the advisor (Acc = {0, 1}) is the same as the accuracy of the subject
in agreement trials, while is opposite in disagreement. By counting correct
and error rates for each advisor separately, the model obtains a trial-by-trial
estimation of the advisor’s accuracy rate, θ, as the ratio between the number





where αi and βi are the correct and error counts respectively, during the










t = 1 here represents the first encounter with advisor i while t = n
represents the last one. A slight complication in Experiment 1, however, is
that advisors also provided a binary confidence judgment associated with the
advice. A simple way for the model to make use of advisor’s confidence is
by treating it as a linear scaler of the advice received. We applied a set of
arbitrary weights to the four possible advice scenarios, namely the advisor
is (1) correct and confident, (2) correct but unsure, (3) incorrect and unsure
and (4) incorrect but confident (Table 1). Although arbitrary, any set of
weights that preserves the order of such events would result in similar final
advisor preferences.
Event Observed
Inaccurate Inaccurate Accurate Accurate
Confident Unsure Unsure Confident
Feedback -1 -0.5 +0.5 +1
Disgree Disagree Agree Agree
Confident Unsure Unsure Confident
No-Feedback -1 -0.5 +0.5 +1
Table 1: Model weights (w) applied to different advice events observed in
the Feedback and No-Feedback scenario.









.5− .5 ∗ wt (9)
This set of equations results in values of 1, 0.75, 0.25 and 0 for the
four events listed above respectively. Although these values could be simply
summed to obtain α and β values, the unusual formulation of the equations 8
and 9 was preferred to be coherent with the equations describing the follow-
ing models. They show how a simple model can take into account feedback,
advice received and advisors’ expressed confidence to track over time the
objective reliability of its advisors.
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3.2 Consensus Model
When feedback is removed from the participants, as in the No-Feedback con-
dition of Experiment 1, the model does not have access to the advisors’ ob-
jective accuracy. It must then rely on different proxies for objective accuracy
and integrate those instead over time. The first cue to underlying accuracy
rate we considered is agreement rate. When two independent agents express
judgments on a binary task, the agreement rate between the two linearly
scales with the accuracy of each whenever the accuracy rate is higher than
chance: Agr = Acc1 ∗ Acc2 + (1 − Acc1) ∗ (1 − Acc2). We thus adapted the
equations of the Accuracy model above to exploit this covariation. Instead
of tracking the accuracy rates of its advisors, the Consensus model tracks
their agreement rates with subjective judgments. Thus equations 8 and 9
can be used to estimate a θ value by now using as wt the scaled agreement
observed on encounter t as described in Table 1. To take into account the fact
that in Experiment 1 advisors expressed a binary confidence judgment them-
selves associated with the advice, we used the same linear weights applied to
the Accuracy model also to scale agreement (Table 1). In other words this
model perfectly conflates accuracy with agreement, assuming that whenever
an advisor agrees with the subjective original judgment, the advisor must be
correct. Although this clearly is a simplifying assumption, the model offers
a useful proof of concept to understand what inferences an agent lacking
metacognitive insight can make simply by using heuristics. It can thus pro-
vide a benchmark to quantify the information that is present in the advice
received.
3.3 Confidence Model
A more nuanced strategy that could be employed to estimate advisors’ re-
liability when feedback is not directly available is through use of internal
metacognitive signals. Trial-level variability in subjective confidence is known
to covary with objective accuracy in a perceptual task (?) and it theoreti-
cally represents the estimated likelihood of having made a correct judgment
and/or selected the correct response (?). Thus, instead of simply using agree-
ment rates as a cue for accuracy rate, a model endowed with metacognitive
insight could accumulate over time the subjective probability that an advisor
expressed a correct judgment. A Confidence model was created under the
assumption that the trial-by-trial subjective reports of confidence are directly
8
related to the true underlying estimated probabilities of having chosen the
correct answer. On agreement trials the model estimates the probability of
the advice being correct as the subjective probability of a correct answer.
Conversely on disagreement trials the model estimates the probability of the
advice being correct as the probability of having itself made an error. In
other words trial-level agreement (Agr = {0, 1}) is scaled by trial-confidence
expressed as a probability over outcomes (correct vs. incorrect response).








.5− (pt(corr)− .5) ∗ wt (11)
where wt represents the scaled trial-level agreement as described in Table
1 and p(corr) represents pre-advice confidence. As described below, rather
than taking participants’ confidence as a pure index of subjective p(corr), we
transformed the value to (1) reduce inter-subjects variability and (2) increase
scale sensitivity. Regardless, the crucial point is that this model capitalises
on the fact that being in agreement or disagreement with an advisor is more
informative when the model is itself confident that it gave a correct answer
than when it is more likely to have made a mistake.
Experiments 2-3. In Experiments 2 and 3, advisors did not express a
level of confidence with their judgments. This allowed to simplify the above
equations describing the three models. The Accuracy model could be sim-
plified using equations 6 and 7 to compute α and β for each advisor instead
of equations 8 and 9. Similarly, the Consensus model now computes α and








.5− .5 ∗ Agrt (13)
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where Agrt is the partner’s consensus (Agr = {−1, 1}) observed on en-









.5− (p(corr)− .5) ∗ Agrt (15)
where p(corr) is the pre-advice confidence expressed in probability scale
as described in equation 18.
3.4 Bayesian update
All model variants can use the current estimated advisor’s reliability θ to
appropriately update the pre-advice probability of having selected the correct
answer p(corr) into a normative posterior, based on the binary advice A
received (agree vs. disagree):
p(corr|Ai) = p(corr)p(A
i|corr)
p(corr)p(Ai|corr) + p(err)p(Ai|err) (16)
where p(err) is the subjective probability of making a mistake on the cur-
rent trial and p(Ai|corr) is the probability that advisor i agrees or disagrees
given that the participant’s choice is correct. Prior probability p(corr) is es-
timated from a simple linear transformation of the pre-advice trial-level con-
fidence data obtained from the participants after appropriate pre-processing.
Pre-processing consisted in a parameter-free transformation that (a) brings
all subjective confidence distributions on to a similar scale thus reducing the
inter-subject variability and (b) expands the centre of the original subjective
confidence distributions so to increase the informativeness of the average
trial. This operation was inspired by recent models of adaptive information
gain control (?). According to these proposals, the brain adapts the gain
of neuronal firing to the range of information available over different time
scales and cognitive domains (??). Here it serves the purpose of increasing
the discriminability or information gain of different trials so that trials that
are close together on confidence scale gets pulled apart on to a probability
scale. The transformation uses parameters obtained from the data:
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Cˆpre = N ∗ normcdf(Cpre) (17)
where normcdf(C) is the normal cumulative density function of the pre-
advice confidence C ratings distribution, and N is the number of confidence
ratings available on each interval of the scale (in Experiments 1,2: N = 5;
in Experiment 3: N = 50). This simple transformation has the property of
translating a normal distribution into a uniform distribution in the range
[0, N ]. Notice that this transformation does not affect the ranking of con-
fidence judgments but only their spacing along a probability scale. After
pre-processing, confidence ratings were translated into a probability scale
with the linear transformation:
p(corr) = 0.5 + (0.1− ) ∗ Cˆpre (18)
where  is a small jitter ( = .002) introduced to avoid maximum confi-
dence ratings being turned into probability of one and zero, which would in
turn cause inconsistencies within the Bayesian formula (e.g., no confidence
change regardless of advice reliability). Thus p(corr) represents trial-level
confidence on a probability scale, which can be interpreted as the probability
that the participant assigns to having given a correct answer on a given trial.
From p(corr) we can also derive the subjective probability that a given trial
will end up in an error: p(err) = 1− p(corr).
To estimate the likelihood term p(Ai|corr) in equation 16 we applied a
simple heuristic that uses the reliability θ of a given advisor:
p(Ai|corr) = θA ∗ (1− θ)1−A (19)
The equation above simply states that the probability of observing advisor
i’s agreement (Ai = 1) when the participant is correct is equal to the accuracy
rate of the advisor itself, assuming advisor’s and participant’s judgments are
independent. Instead the probability of observing disagreement (Ai = 0) on
the same trials is the advisor’s error rate. In other words, the probability
of agreement in trials when the participant is correct is the probability that
the advisor too is correct. Similarly the probability of disagreement in trials




Discounting advice was obtained by a linear regression toward the uncertainty
point .5 using the following equation:
E ′s = 0.5 + (θ ∗ (p′(A)− 0.5)) (20)
The following figures supplement, figures in the main text.
Figure 2: Clustering difference between agents who use discounting and
agents who don’t. Left panel: agents do not update their bias. Right panel:
agents update their bias.
Figure 3: Trust of each subpopulation toward population 2.
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Figure 4: Bias distribution and evolution in simulations where agents dis-
count advice proportionally to trust in the advisor.
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Figure 5: Average trust as a function of probability of feedback and noise.
Trust appears to decrease as noise increases and feedback availability de-
creases.
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Figure 6: Average agreement rate as a function of probability of feedback and
noise. Agreement with ingroup appears to decrease as a function of increasing
noise, while agreement with outgroup tends to increase as a function of noise.
On the contrary, feedback availability does not affect agreement rates.
15
